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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
JAMES BARCLAY SMITH t
THERE IS A great amount of material on this subject. Generally,
it takes an unfavorable view of the so-called sovereign immunity
rule. Factual niceties are cumulated with a critical analysis to dwarf
by bulk and height the mass voice of many judicial opinions denying
a cause of action to the individual crushed in the machinery of govern-
ment. The purpose here is not to try to out-talk the recorded
vocalization of "sovereign" immunity, merely to change its tune. It
is hoped here to demonstrate that such relief is a fundamental right of
our American scheme to which sovereign immunity is foreign and
excluded. This is a serious task.
I. ,
A.
If one had not been born to this world, he would have no problem
of living in it. However, as soon as one is born, his troubles begin.
We shall have enough trouble with man's legal relations if we start
observing him as an adult unit of society. Such relations exist in all
situations of responsibility whether reflected in rights or duties. What
they are will be found in the purposes of society. Whether one's injury
entitles him to relief requires the agents of society, courts or legislators,
to determine whether the purposes of society will be served better by
letting the injury lie where it has fallen or by shifting it back from
whence it came. When the latter, and the source is the defendant, the
plaintiff will be said to have stated a cause of action. It, therefore,
follows that all injury is not actionable.
B.
The vice of inference arises from phrasings such as liability and
liability without fault. These always seem hitched to "negligence."
Conceptualism is defeated when everyone thinks of liability as de-
pendent upon negligence. Liability is the generic. Negligence is but
t Professor of Law, University of Kansas. B.S., 1924, University of Kansas;
LL.B., 1926, University of Kansas; J.S.D., 1927, Yale University. Author of Studies
in the Adequacy of The Constitution (1939).
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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
a single gauge, indexing, when relevant, an occasion for liability.
Since the association of recovery with negligence is common, liability
and negligence carelessly become fused. The confusion is compounded
by making fault and negligence synonymous. Well-meant quests for
recognition of responsibility for injury are expressed as liability without
fault (without negligence). Some individuals thus become engulfed
in a smog of life without risk, while our problem is one of a license
to maim. Surely, there is no insurance in general law against all
injury. Living among men involves risk of injury. On the other
hand, we no less must make certain that one does not have to carry
his own insurance against injury from every source or of all types.
We do this when we shift the burden or responsibility back from
whence it came. When we do, we relieve the injured person of the
risk and place it, for its deterrent effect or otherwise, upon the source,
because so doing is believed best to serve the public interest, or policy,
or purposes of our scheme of popular government.'
We are a law-abiding people under ordered government. We
posit both a politics and an economics of individualism. Ordered
government means that a program of reason replaces violence and
anarchy and the rule of law provides solution of disputes under the
aegis of the state. The state declares the legal consequences of certain
facts and it does this as the degree of public concern barometers the
policy under the circumstances. We stratify in categories of crimes
and delicts impacts causing bodily injury, and for commercial loss we
speak of the integrity of contract.' These in turn are articulated in
legal actions as the occasion arises.
It is said that a body politic is a social compact by which the
whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the
whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common
good. This was so as we undertook, through state and federal con-
stitutions, to give practical effect to such as we deemed necessary for
the common good and security of life and property. The governments,
so organized, are themselves agents of the common sovereignty; and,
within this constitutionally authorized jurisdiction and for practical
purposes, acts as if sovereign. Standards or laws are found from and
in the purpose of these governments. They are determined by cus-
tomary force or initiated by positive declaration. A diversified articu-
lation is found in the agencies of government, in the courts and
1. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), affirming L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866),
is but a symptom of this phenomenon. It is not the source.
2. See Smith, Governmental Function and the Statement of a Cause of Action, 21
B. U. L. Rsv. 236 (1941).
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commissions, i.e.,.by, judicial and non-judicial. tribunals. Both, ad-
minister law.
C:
The universal judicial phrasing relating to governmentally asserted
restraints is that regulation is the exception and. freedom from regu-
lationis the rule. This is the corollary of our. fundamental, bifurcated
individualism. Our implicit assumption is of a~dynamic society going
decently. about its own business. This comprehends the individual,
similarly, with an inherent energy and free choice, expressing a natural
propriety and deference which reflect 'the established customs and
morality.. As we scurry about in self-selected courses, collision is inevi-
table, consequential and self-borne. Because some will lag, or because
orientation in common good requires, we must stimulate or restrain
free choice. Here is the usual contradiction in the claim of unrestrained
individualism. It is not as much as .an expression of individual liberty
as it is an unreasonable restriction upon the liberty of others. Highway
rules must be provided to. avoid the collision. Bumps of one type
must be self-absorbed. That is the risk of normal living in society.
But in other types the injury is caused by the other fellow breaking
lane. By making him repair the injury, he is taught caution and
compelled to replace the divot. By shifting the burden from where it
falls, back to where it came from, a general discipline is achieved by
the adversary action.3 The nostalgic phrasing to so use your own
that you do not injure another justifies the government in regulating
the conduct of one citizen toward the other within the public policy. If
the defendant had intended, but failed, to keep his own lane instead
of preempting the plaintiff's he still would have been liable. This
would also be true where,.free wheeling instead of recognizing plaintiff's
right of normal clearance, he failed to exercise the expected self-restraint.
This causes our sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas to be translated as
negligence, and the comfortable conclusion that liability is measured
by fault, meaning negligence; and the generalized non sequitur that if
no negligence or fault, then no liability. But there are three situations
of injury in causal relation and three results. In one there was no
liability, but in the. second there was; and, true enough, the test in this
situation was negligence.
D.
In the third, the party causing the injury may be liable without
negligence, or he may not, be liable even. though he is negligent.
3. Ibid.
[:V L. 2.::p; 16.
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Because most of our business of assessing responsibility involves the
second, the third situation is exceptional. Easy examples demonstrate
the point. We long since have ceased even to concern ourselves with
the quality of a common carrier's conduct. We provided against any
inclination to connive with Robin and his brother hoods, who might
beset the path through the forests, for a split of swag, by making the
common carrier pay for the whole cargo. By shifting the burden to
the source, the public obtained generally safe carriage. But, because
we felt we had to have railroads and believing investors would not
come forward if they had to pay abutting owners for negligent noise
and smoke and cinders, we made such injury privileged.' The rule
strives for the objective of the common good. The facts disclose
whether it is served by shifting or resting the injury. In one, the
situation is actionable. In the other, the injury is the risk the injured
must carry, damnum absque injuria. The tying of fault into negligence
in synonym instead of perspective inquiry into policy is an example of
the misfortune of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and
thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis. We must
try to probe it if relief is to be found for the individual mangled by
the machinery of government."
Who is at fault or who is to blame are common expressions for
who is responsible. It naturally followed, when negligence and fault
were lumped, that liability for causal injury sans negligence was said to
be liability without fault. That does seem rather shocking and allows
the conclusion of being extraordinary and exceptional. When we
are looking for whom to blame ordinarily we ask who is at fault. When
this is done, fault moves away from negligence to the generic. Liability
(fault or blame) is not dependent upon negligence. Negligence is
but the gauge or index of liability when the usual fact balance equates
the risk. This is the risk of the normal or ordinary living pattern
and so we talk about ordinary risk. This will tend to balance fairly
the expectancies of decent people.
4. The old cases of injury by the charitable hospital, volunteer firemen, and homi-
cide in self defense accord. Cf., Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d
934 (1954) ; Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950).
5. Negligent injury ordinarily actionable was held immaterial on grounds of public
policy when doing so would impair severely the effectiveness of Coast Guard rescue
operations and the morale of the service personnel. Dougherty Co. v. United States,
207 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954). The interest in secur-
ing the individual his repair was subordinated to the interest in having the protection
commonly available in this type of danger. It is so important to preserve the integrity
of the judicial process that we punish perjury committed at a trial that was held in
violation of the accused's rights. United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954). See also, Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113
A.2d 671 (1955), affirmed on rehearing, 18 N.J. 611, 114 A.2d 863 (1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 887 (1955).
.-NOVEMBER 1956]
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E.
Two material and distinctive variants appear. If foolhardy, one
thrusts or submits himself to observable likelihood of injury, he may
have little sympathy when he asks fair-minded men to compel the
one at the other end to make him whole by payment. He may be said
to have assumed the risk. When Campo asked the court to give him
relief because it relieved MacPherson, he went too far. Where the
very nature of the article gives notice and warning of the consequences
to be expected, the manufacturer has a right to expect that users will
do everything necessary to avoid the obvious danger. He walked
into it with his eyes open.' But the reverse of this will occur when,
although going the noiseless tenor of his way, the individual is beset
by proximate threat or actual injury. This list is long. Because of
the oppressive disadvantage forced upon him, he is thought of as a
victim, since he ordinarily is unable to escape or defend himself. In
the former, he moves out of the norm to dig up something on his own.
In the latter, he remains in the norm and a hazard rises above the
ordinary. The victim can neither avoid nor withstand the pressures
to which he is subjected. If we feel that the resulting inequality is not
to be tolerated, we probably have reached the conclusion that there
is a maladministration of the law serious enough to turn the respon-
sibility back upon the source. Fault is found from policy facts and
liability results regardless of negligence. The principle is the same
whether those in immediate relation are persons, or persons and the
state. And it is the same whether it grows out of delictual or con-
tractual conduct. 7  We are not here employed with whether the
common concern is so great that privilege of acceptance of the effect
by the injured party is withdrawn or permitted.'
The timbers of our legal structure are the fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which sustain and promote our civil and political
institutions. They are those which right-minded men espouse as
basic to the ordered liberty of a free people under popular, representative
government. They are principles of justice rooted in the tradition and
6. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
7. Cf. Dutill v. Dana, 113 A.2d 499 (Me. 1955); E. W. Scripps v. Fulton, 125
N.E. 2d 896 (Ohio 1955); Satery v. Great American Reserve Insurance Co., 278
S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
8. Consider problems of self-incrimination with rights of wages stated by the
Federal Wages and Hours Act; and situations as in United States v. Nielson, 349
U.S. 129 (1955) ; Boston Metals v. S. S. Winding Gulf, 349 U.S. 122 (1955) ; Bisso
v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955). Consider also progression under the
Interstate Commerce Act; Pennsylvania R.R. vs. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477 (1903). The
progression may go either way. See also Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543
(1924) ; Kahn v. James Burton Co. 5 Ill. 2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955).
[VOL. 2: p. 16
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conscience of our people. Constitutional policy may be implicit as
well as explicit. The implied is contained as well as the expressed.
Many features posited in fundamental principles may fail of achieve-
ment in practice without a failure of our system or even a threat to it.
But merely because it is possible to go on generally very well without
them is no justification for continuing the error of their denial. Over-
sight and error are not precedents in governmental administration.'
The loss of bearing points is only an invitation to attain the highway
when the compass point is disclosed. That will be achieved in this
survey if we can reflect the accountability of government to the in-
dividual it mangles in its machinery.
II.
A.
We are observing the process of government or the administration
of government, and this commonly is called Administrative Law. The
persons we will contact in our search for isogonic lines will be the
individual, the official, and the Government. The individual is within
the process of government and gets injured by its impact upon him.
The official physically confronts the individual and delivers the blow.
The government put him there to act its mandates. It enacts that
which he transmits or acts. Each in turn may have a cause of action
against any of the others. As the government writes the standards
which concern the individual and the official, only they will appear
within our project as victims.'" The language of the court in the
second Morgan case exposes our friction borders.
"The maintenance of proper standards on the part of adminis-
trative agencies in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions
is of the highest importance and in no way cripples or embarrasses
the exercise of their appropriate authority. On the contrary, it
is in their manifest interest. For as we said at the outset, if these
multiplying agencies deemed to be necessary in our complex
society are to serve the purposes for which they are created and
endowed with vast powers, they must accredit themselves by acting
in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the
basic concepts of fair play." "
9. Compare, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) with Hammer v. Dag-
enhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
10. In crimes, it might be possible to parallel the government with the others on
the receiving end. But that is why it characterizes their conduct as crimes and equalizes
in its own protection by exacting the pound of flesh, or, in superlative degree, the
whole carcass. This is not our concern here.
11. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1936).
NOVEMBER 1956]
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This casts forcefully the pattern we are observing. The govern-
ment :cannot do its business without the administrative commission
and the individual is compelled to deal with it. Compelled, because its
process mandates him, and compelled because it is commonly the sole
source of his remedy under law. In the latter, dependency expresses the
compulsion. The former speaks for itself. The official is not drafted,
but dependency (need and public service) also brings him in. The
government invests him with jurisdiction over the individual.' 2 We
speak of the jurisdiction as power and duty, but it resolves into solely
one of duty, i.e.,, duty to exercise wisely the power to serve the expressed
public policy. It is the "duty" that defines the office. As government
must use men, error is unavoidable. Our immediate concern turns to
the proposition of holding the "person" for the fault of the "official"
where causal injury vents itself on the individual.
B.
This is an important problem, foremost in its importance to the
proper functioning of government. It is a prime exposition of the
adjustment of responsibility for fault as facts change and understanding
of the situation increases. Torts teachers seem satisfied to conclude
that the person exercising the office is liable personally to the victim;
and they pass this off rather lightly. Proximity and fault were eloquent.
The victim's plight was pathetic. It was dramatized to the Judge
through the misty sovereign immunity back-drop which shrouded off
the propelling force and left the official in isolated emphasis. The
objective was the repair of the victim, and everyone saw the need and
felt the justice of this. It had to be pinned on someone. The defendant
official swung the instrument.1" The victim was wholly innocent. The
official's hands were bloody. The notches which escaladed the public
policy to liability were, therefore, two fold. In the hierarchy of official-
dom, these fellows calling their procedure quasi-judicial were blots on
the escutcheon of the pure judicial. 4 This was a time when the law
was administered through the courts. The authority exercised by the
commissioner was relatively unimportant and appeared as an encroach-
ment. Of dubious legitimacy, it seemed consistent with our basic
12. We never quite seem to be able to keep distinct the person from the officer.
13. No one paused to note that it was the official ensign of authority, the mace
of state, with which he struck.
14. They were so contemptible that they were not worthy of contempt. People
v. Swena, 88 Colo. 337, 296 Pac. 271 (1931). The distinguished trial judge in Inter-
state Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 155 U.S. 1 (1894), found them
so revolting that he denied that they even could carry the sovereign's message to a
judge.
S[VOL. 2: p. 16
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postulate that the deterrent resulting from shifting the risk to the
putative source, at least, was not undesirable. The other features
weighted the balance in favor of holding the official. 5 A change of
facts caused redistribution of this result.
Before the turn of the century the complexity of government had
advanced to the point where the commission no longer could be thought
of as nominal and a nuisance.' Now, all courts refer spontaneously to
the commission as "necessary." Their major role in the administration
of government is expressed with full force and declaratory purpose.
These commissions contain an ultimate fact which is the catalytic
agent to redistribute the liability previously cast upon the official. The
ultimate fact is that an office, once negligible and nominal to the business
of government, now is on as high a plane of importance as that of the
judge. Thus, the rule which describes the liability of the judge will
give the same result with the commissioner. The value of this analysis
is that it is unnecessary to say that the early view of officer liability
was an anamorphosis. The great point is that we have a different case
and the common rule produces the right result, namely, the judge
liability result and for the same reason. This assures consistency in a
science of law and not just a convenience served by chance of disfavor.
When the reason appears, parallel action must follow in application. 7
An examination of the judge rule is necessary.
III.
A.
The phenomenon we are observing arises from the mangling of
the individual by the faulty operation of a machine of government.
When the operator was a commissioner," functioning in a lower
stratum of government order, we healed the injured individual with
15. We may have occasion, as we go along, to note such addenda as negligence in
ministerial action and wilfulness in discretionary action of the non-judicial official.
16. "All must recognize the fact that the full information necessary as a basis
of intelligent legislation by Congress from time to time upon the subject of interstate
commerce cannot be obtained, nor can the rules established for the regulation of such
commerce be efficiently enforced, otherwise than through the instrumentality of an
administrative body, representing the whole country, always watchful of the general
interests, and charged with the duty not only of obtaining the required information,
but of compelling by all lawful methods obedience to such rules." Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 474 (1894).
17. It is not necessary to deny our ancestry to conclude that Grandpa need not
bring in the "kitchen wood" before breakfast can be prepared on the electric range,
but it still is necessary to "fire the stove" before the food can be cooked. We need not
deny the existence of the Potomac to conclude that there must be a bath tub in the
White House. While the president still must bathe, he no longer depends upon the
creek. The principle prevails, but the place of its application has shifted. We practice
life differently as we learn more about health and immunization.
18. Sort of a lower form of life, like a tadpole.
NOVEMBER 1956]
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golden salve from commissioner's pocket. However, when applying
public policy to himself, it always, or for so long that it is immaterial
here, has been clear to the judge that the victim of the faulty operation
of his machine must find cure elsewhere or go without. This was
not a matter of foot work or any benefit-of-clergy privilege for wrong
doing, but was a fundamentally sound application of principle. The
purpose of government would fail because the connecting link between
law making and law receiving or the protection of even-handed justice
would be corroded. The court being the equator, the equation would
burst. ". . [J]udges of courts . . . are not liable . . . for
their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdic-
tion, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." "9
Judges in the regular judicial hierarchy, acting within the judicial
function, always have had immunity because
"liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved
by the action of the judge, would be inconsistent with the posses-
sion of this freedom [to act on his own convictions without fear
of personal consequences] and would destroy that independence
without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful
. . . it would establish the weakness of judicial authority in
degrading responsibility." 20
We wanted to see a right in the individual to recover, but the
view of judge immunity, because necessary to the strength and inde-
pendence of the judiciary, was more compelling. 1
This was not a promotional program of sadistic urges in judges
toward their customers. The obligation to do justice is integral with
governance. The court is an instrument of government and the judge
works for the government. The obligation to do justice is owed to
it, and for its breach he is responsible in the form of impeachment
proceeding and removal, and liable to criminal prosecution.2
B.
It seems the commissioner succeeded in sloughing his tail and
crawling up the bank a long time before he was observed sitting on
the same relative plain on which the judge sits. While we do not
think of him as having a smooth bench to sit on, we, long since, have
19. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871). The ancestry is long
and strong. Floyd v. Barker, 12 Co. 13, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608) ; Fray v. Black-
burn, 3 B. & S. 576, 122 Eng. Rep. 217 (1863); Usill v. Hales, 3 C.P.S. 319, 329
(1878).
20. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871). See Kent, J., in Yates
v. Lansing, 5 Johns 282, 291 (N.Y. 1810) ; Fray v. Blackburn, 3 B. & S. 576, 122 Eng.
Rep. 217 (1863).
21. This left the remedy handle of his "right" beyond his reach for the moment.
22. Sweeney v. Young, 82 N.H. 159, 131 AtI. 155 (1925).
[VOL. 2: p. 16
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felt the tendency to confine within narrow limits the liability of public
officers. The necessity of attracting capable men, able to make deci-
sions without fear of personal liability and without being harassed
by lawsuits, has been thought to outweigh any interest that might exist
in allowing the individual relief against the official for bad official
action. This policy has dictated that public officers shall not be liable
for acts done in an official capacity.' The general level appears cast
by Cooper v. O'Connor.24 As the commission is termed quasi-judicial
perhaps this rule is quasi cy pres.25 But against a plaintiff's contention
that he acted without the scope of authority, wantonly, maliciously,
and unlawfully to his damage, the commissioner was cleared as if he
were a judge. The court held the presence of malice or other bad
motives is not sufficient to impose civil liability upon the commissioner
acting within the scope of his authority.2" When Gregoire sued the
Attorney General 27 for damages alleging malice, lack of reasonable
cause, etc., the court, speaking through Judge L. Hand, held that an
allegation of malice would not make actionable, conduct that otherwise
was within an officer's jurisdiction. It may seem "monstrous," said
the court, to hold that an officer can with immunity "vent his spleen"
on others, but officers should not be subjected to "the dread of retalia-
tion" for doing their duty."
IV.
A.
It was the obvious merit of the victim which composed the
hard-cases-make-bad-law complex of making the commissioner guar-
23. Immunity has been extended to: cabinet officers, Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.
483 (1896) ; Standard Nut Margine v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; depart-
ment heads, Lang v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; city managers and building
inspectors, White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal. App.2d 307, 73 P.2d 254 (1937). Accord:
Sweeney v. Young, 82 N.H. 159, 131 At. 155 (1925) ; Moran v. McClearns, 60 Barb.
388 (N.Y. 1871) ; Rains v. Simpson, 50 Tex. 495 (1878). See generally, Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
24. 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1938).
25. The commissioner still wears the tonsure, not the coif.
26. The defendants were the comptroller of the currency, the receiver of the Com-
mercial National Bank of the District of Columbia, the general counsel for the divi-
sion of insolvent banks of the Treasury Department, the deputy comptroller of the
currency of the United States, the United States attorney, and a special agent for the
Bureau of Investigation.
27. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
An alien was held in custody by the Attorney General from 1942 to 1946. Gregoire
was a "native" of Metz, Lorraine. Metz was German at his birth, French during World
War II. Biddle held him as an "alien enemy." Three courts refused to release him,
a fourth found him to be a Frenchman and did release him.
28. In Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 341
U.S. 921 (1951), the court holds that not only judicial or quasi-judicial, but executive
officers exercising discretion may not be sued. See Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188,
88 A.2d 892 (1952).
NOVEMBER 1956]
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antee the perfection of government out of his own pocket. The view
was distorted by the shadow of "you cannot sue the sovereign'' across
the highway of just relief. If that is real and persisting, so far, all
that we have succeeded in doing is taking our victim for a ride along
a dead-end street. It is as if, when sense is restored to one arm of
government, it is lost in the other. Only when sensory response can
be had in both will tonicity be restored to a healthy body politic.
Happily, it seems there are cumulative, restorative stimulants. When
applied with conscious awareness of the facts, they will dissolve the
.road block on the highway of public policy to just relief. Two things
are indisputable. The victim must be compensated. The commissioner
must be emancipated.
It would seem to follow that the owner of the mangling machine
who put the force in motion must respond. He knew what would
happen, he persists, and he has the continuing benefit. The only
doubt that could be raised comes from the general public interest as
distinguished from the special public interest. If government account-
ability would threaten the existence of the government or stifle its
utility, then public policy would require its arbitrary insulation. This
is about as realistic as to say that each of us must stop breathing for
fear that so much air will be used up that there will not be enough
left for the others to breathe.
B.
As we continue, the first principle of our scheme of government
must be constant. The sovereign will, constitutionally stipulated,
cannot be contradicted by any one department or any combination of
them. As explained in Marbury v. Madison,2" these departments
function only when they serve and not when they corrupt. Since
they compose the government, they serve when they accord the public
policy, expressed in setting up American governments, that "all shall
be governed by certain laws for the common good." " This has
many spigots from which flow the good of government as it serves
the popular sovereign."l It is misleading to follow the frequent phras-
ing of the "facets of government" as if it were just an ornament. It
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
30. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1877). "'A body politic,' as so aptly de-
fined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 'is a social compact by
which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole
people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.'"
31. It includes the primary sense of law, namely, notice or warning which is im-
plemented specially in such clauses as ex post facto or bill of attainder. This is the
due process of law.
[VOL. 2: p. 16
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is not an ornament but a servant. When it serves well it is good to
think of it as a jewel, but the flashing, shiny surface blinds and
hypnotizes to the loss of introspective reason. There are two legal
personalities, the sovereign and its agent or the "government". In
applying the great principles of government, Illinois was dealing with
an aggressor against society in Munn and Scott. Its government
acting for the common good could abate the nuisance. We are dealing
with the reverse, the victim of wrongful government action. If we
undertook a good faith government which must mean a responsible
government, we should examine the fiction which helped to switch
the victim's case to a side track.
About the only thing we invented with this government was
organization by a written constitution. And even it had novelty only
in the new use. 2  We long had- been aware of what we wanted. Of
course, the problem was how to reach and control a government serving
truths held to be self-evident. To do this our founding fathers planned
a "new government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely
to effect their Safety and Happiness." " Safety, happiness, good faith,
justice, and general welfare sound of no privilege to the new form of
administration to mutilate the individual with impunity.
C.
The cause of action we are watching may have been the genesis
of the fundamental constitutional function. The sovereign constantly
speaks expressing the general will through the written word so that the
judiciary applies the rule of law when the legislature's enactment is
presented in a case or controversy. The government, not the sovereign,
is sued when it perverts what the sovereign approves or protects. Our
common or general sovereignty is hypostatized in the "government for
administration." The former states the extent and limits of the latter's
agency by means of constitutions. There is no mystery in this. The
mystery is how a court can come up with the idea that a statute "will
be stricken down as a perversion of the sovereign power." " Obviously,
as sovereignty is power beyond dispute, whatever it directed would
describe the law to be enforced by its judicial agency. What the court
32. This is its strength. There is no theoretical spangle to garnish an uncured
theory. It is the meat of history cured in the fires of hope and freedom.
33. Declaration of Independence. July 4, 1776.
34. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 50, 58 A.2d 464, 478
(1948). See also Commonwealth v. Sun Ray Drug Company, 383 Pa. 1, 17, 116 A.2d
833, 841 (1955).
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fails to understand is that it was the agency of government that was
perverted because it acted in contradiction and excess of the limit set
by the sovereign through its constitution. The sovereign stretched the
line on which the individual hung his case against the government. 5
This "happy little blurb" of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will
serve as a convenient medium through which to decorticate the
"can't sue the sovereign rule."
D.
This national scheme was conceived in common language which
abolished privilege of class and person by recognizing the self-evident
equality of creation and rights of life, liberty, and property. The
travail of the centuries to achieve popular sovereignty is assumed. The
tradition is galvanized in language which states: "That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed . . ," " As the crown
moved from the king to the people, the personality of government
became more distinct from the sovereign and found its jurisdiction in
an agency of consent. The protection against license by individuals
and by governments was sought in ordered government under the
law in the representative republic.3 7  These precepts of popular
sovereignty and representative government, held in juxtaposition by a
constitution, "are supposed to have been long and well established." 38
Where there is sovereign action, there is no illegality. There
can be no conflict." His conduct expresses his will and his will is
law. As it is lawful, there can be no fault in him and injury which
results to the individual is damnum sine injuria esse potest.40
We reach James Stuart through the Tudors. Vested with a
heritage combining every source of government power, he was nourished
35. When the government acting through the legislature stays within its jurisdic-
tion, its order is as if it were sovereign for then it enacts the sovereign's will-valid
as to the individual even if it says "off with his head."
36. Declaration of Independence. July 4, 1776.
37. Along here, the democracy of natural law proved to be a little too much
choice and too little duty.
38. "That the people had an original right to establish, for their future govern-
ment, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness,
is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this
original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be frequently re-
peated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the
authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed
to be permanent. This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns
to different departments their respective powers." It established "certain limits not to
be transcended by those departments." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cr.) 137, 176
(1803).
39. It comes to us as self-sufficient that le roi le veut.
40. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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by an environment of absolutism expressed by Louis XIV-L'etat,
c'est moi. The central point in the belief of James I, the point around
which all his actions revolve, was his belief in the divine right of kings.
In his mind, the king was something more than a mere mortal ruler,
he was divinely appointed of God; resistance to whom was a hardly
less heinous sin than rebellion against the only superior a king should
own." The contest between James and the Commons was begun at
the very outset of his reign by his attempt to interfere with the election
of the members to his parliament. Claiming progress in the recognition
of the individual, the first parliament under James set forth "that
our privileges and liberties are of right and due inheritance no less than
our very lands and goods." The Stuart's disregard of these claims
fulminated in the Petition of Rights of 1628. Great as this landmark
is in the gestation of American constitutions, it failed of obligation to
the Crown. The Stuart held himself so far removed by Divine
Providence above his subjects that he could not be held bound by any
promises or contracts made with them. Remonstrance swelled to
tumultuousness in the session of 1629. Command to adjourn was
delayed behind locked doors for passage of resolutions of remonstrance.
After it was adjourned by force, Charles demonstrated that the king
was sovereign for the eleven years of extreme tyranny which followed.
With Richelieu as a line backer, the Stuarts prevailed until 1688. The
second James recovered the fumbles and regained the old pedestal in
his four years as the sovereign state. By this time, it is little wonder
that obligatory promise was sought as an operative curb on the Crown.42
In the meantime, there was a problem of reality. Necessity is the
mother of ideas and something more important than life is a mighty
stimulant. The political principle implicit pervades the process of law.
E.
Every modern book we pick up is stuffed with a mysticism veiled
in allegory about phrasings of the king can do no wrong, the king will
do no wrong, and the king cannot command himself to appear in his
own courts. Of course, true virtue is without sin; and, where it
exists, there can be no sin. Such a person is incapable of sin and will
not commit sin. But this does not exclude charity. Sovereignty
41. It is against this, later, that natural law rendered its great service in the tra-
dition to popular sovereignty.
42. Our later language of contract seems more natural than "natural law." See
note 30 supra. With our tradition in 1776 of sovereignty from the Crown to popular
sovereignty, the idea of consent and delegation speak a new foundation of power. See
note 33 supra.
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served as the symbol of perfection.' The sovereign's choice was law:
There was no ex post facto clause of limitation. It was a continuing
discretion. Again, as injury resulting from that choice could not be
an injury contrary to law, no actionable conduct was involved. As
the injuring was privileged, the injury was not actionable. 4 As the
sovereign's laws would express the the relations of his subjects, they
did not bind him. It was not that he could not go into his courts,
but that, if he did, there would be no court but himself. The decisional
power of the sovereign would absorb the representative.45 However,
the king could run his business, his governing, any way he wanted to.46
He could provide direct grace or indirect grace.47 On the first,
discretion was reserved, the representative court which took power
only from him, obviously, could not rise above him to command his
appearance to answer contrary to law or his prerogative. 8  However,
he could make provision for relief by delegating a stake to be attached
as merit might appear from injury.49 Some explanation for the mass
of literature in protest upon the subject arises from a refusal to recog-
nize the conceptual uniqueness of the English institution, the king, the
sovereign, and the crown, in its immutable invulnerability. Our
problem is tough enough without tilting against theories of state and
people, of corporate fiction, confusion of master and servant relations,
and whether there is law if there is no remedy. They lived with a fact,
albeit, with some reverence to it. No one need deny that when the
king stepped on the individual's foot and broke it that pain was caused.
And it does not prove anything to say that a victim of cancer is sick
even though medical science does not know how to cure him. We may
think of both as cruel, but the pragmatism of it is that they both stay
uncured. It is proper and necesary to search for a compensatory
43. Perfectum est cui nihil deest secundum suae perfectionis vel naturae modum.
44. Because he could not be distrained for refusing to obey his own orders, his
own court orders, the barons sought to impose compulsory jurisdiction. Clause 49 of
the Articles of the Barons was designed to effect this submission. McKecHNZ, MAGCNA
CARTA. (2d ed. 1914) n. 49 at 492. It did not work. Cf., note 41 supra.
45. Law schools, now, decide law school problems under the chancellor of the
university; but, if the chancellor sits in, what the law school wants will be important
only in so far as it is reflected in what the chancellor decides.
46. The student may face the dilemma of choice between studying or going to the
show, but subject to his own conscience, his discretion is uncontrolled. He may lose
his head in over devotion to the second. Charles I lost his. The accounting comes later
and independently.
47. The reverse of this is expressed, now, in some degree, in our direct and in-
direct contempt proceedings.
48. Stoppage thereof by loquendum est cum rege was familiar to Bracton.
49. Edward I recognized relief securing vested lands, in some revenue adjust-
ments, and personal items seized by the sheriff.
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cure for the foot, and we hope to find it. The point is that the King
was privileged." The law must find other affinity.
F.
Something was done for our victim. The birth of our system
of popular sovereignty and organized government was not a parthe-
nogenesis. England did achieve division between the unsuable
sovereign and government as far as was possible. Everything that
could be done was done to make government responsible for the man-
gling of the victim in its machinery. It gives us the idea of form in
the division of process, the two progenitors for normal gestation. Our
trouble arose from not following through in principle when we achieved
clearance in form. Two cases, in 1679 and 1765, are perhaps the most
important in constitutional concept whether in England or America.
They made government the process of law. They eliminated rule by
the arrogance of the moment for purposes of state. They suggest the
permanent governmental structure and the division of authority in a
responsible government instituted "to secure these rights" which ended
the privilege of the government to injure the citizen. While the
sovereign still kept his subjects, the new order of the citizen and his
government evolved. The first case, in 1679, anticipates by ten years
the English Bill of Rights which fixes the obligation of the govern-
ment to the people as the subject is emancipated from the Stuart. The
second one, in 1765, anticipates about ten years the Declaration of
Independence which assumes the tradition of sovereignty finally fixed
through experience of the states in the federal constitution.
The immunity of the sovereign applied to his minister when he
exercised in his own name the authority vested in him by the king.
51
That gulf could not be bridged. The court did the next best thing
in the Case of Earl Danby.52 The proposition is founded that no
servant of the crown could avoid legal liability by pleading obedience
to the command of the sovereign. This moves forward to attach
liability, for conduct actionable at common law, to an officer of the
government in Entick v. Carrington.53 The established principles of
law declare the legal consequences between the official and the indi-
vidual. His injuring conduct thus is declared to be illegal, and this
50. They had been trying without success to pluck other little gems from his pre-
rogative such as purveyances, impressions, etc., beginning with the Great Charter.
51. This is where the argument arose that there was a mistaken application of
the law of master and servant; but the sovereign just was not in master and servant
stratum.
52. 11 St. Tr. 599 (1679).
53. 19 St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
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aborts the claim of immunity. In the Entick case, the court declared
illegal the issue by a secretary of state of a general warrant which had
authorized the seizure by a messenger of the king of all the papers in
the possession of a citizen against whom no charge had been brought.
Opposed were the purpose of state and the pre-established principle of
law. The argument that a power, considered to be in the interest of
the government but contrary to the general law should prevail, was
rejected. The result is demonstrative. The mangling by the official
is a legal wrong. There is actionable conduct. The distinction be-
tween injuring by the government and by others was repudiated. The
law is extended to include the transaction, and immunity ended. A
cure was achieved, and the injury no longer is without remedy. The
highest agency next to the sovereign was held responsible and made to
repair.
G.
Following the revolution of 1688, the emphasis on the distinction
between crown and king often is referred to as a confusing contradiction.
As we moved through the Tudors to the Stuart, the king became
sovereign and constituted the crown. In body and personality, he
was the sovereign state. The concept and the symbol were preserved.
The term, "the Government," began to appear. The sovereign re-
mained in place and so became the government, or conversely. The
king was of the same tissue, and, although stripped of the political
management, it was necesary that his body or person continue to be
held inviolate." The sovereign was not displaced when the person
of the king took abode apart. The reigning power, now called the
crown, continued sovereign. For the same reason as before, account-
ability could not advance from the official. There was no fundamental
organizational change.
V.
A.
In America there was a change. Formation of most of our
colonies was pressured during the Stuarts, a pressure made possible
by a trinity of fusion of the man, the king, and the sovereign. Distance
and the indifference of the Georges gave leash to political expansion of
54. It is commonly heard phrasing, now, the prime minister speaks of the govern-
ment, and the monarch speaks of my government. This both clears the function and
the prestige of the ancient symbolisms. It saves face for everyone and does not con-
found the political action so long as there is no attempt to translate the "my" from
pride and prestige back to an executive possessory.
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self-serving natural law concepts whose leverage pried loose the grip
of the king upon sovereignty and gave the bargaining party, to the
extent that it entered, the Bill of Rights." When George III began
to talk like the James boys, the people of the colonies already had
"the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and
Nature's God entitled them" because "they are endowed by their
creator with certain unalienable rights." 5 When this found fruition
in distribution and constitutional fixation, we had a very different thing
than that which under the crown took political function by simply
squeezing the person of the king out of the cyst of the sovereignty
of government. We pulled sovereignty out of government. England
left it there. They held a symbolism in the king. We eradicated the
king and supplied the gap of symbolism in constitutional function.
While the conception was a process of long travail, the new govern-
ment was born of evulsion; and the mutation was complete.
B.
It is this point that our practice later overlooks. When we
get around to the problem of our victim of government illegality, our
precedent seeking methods betray us." Precedent using was a stabiliz-
ing function, but we missed the switch and ran into a dead-end track.
It was splendid to hitch E1arl Danby onto Entick v. Carrington, but
in following the legalism, we by-passed the politicalism. Those cases
are as sound now as then, and they grant the relief we are seeking
for our victim. They went to the highest reachable rung of government.
When we pulled the king-sovereign-crown off the top and put in the
foundation, our government or state became the suable defendant in
our basic cases. Of course, treating the administrative device, our
government, the same as King James is wrong, and "it undoubtedly
runs counter to modern democratic notions of moral responsibility of
the State." "' It justifies the astonishment of Street, our English
friend. 9 It discloses why the statement, "A sovereign is exempt from
suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right against
the authority which makes the law on which the right belongs" o is
55. See Smith, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Canon, 28 VA. L. Rev. 129(1941).
56. Declaration of Independence. July 4, 1776.
57. Common law legalistic ritual.
58. Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944).
59. "Why this English theory of Sovereign immunity, an immunity originally
personal to the King, came to be applied in the United States is one of the mysteries
of evolution." STREET, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY 8 (1953).
60. Kawananakoa v. Polylank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). The court speaks through
Mr. Justice Holmes.
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both right and wrong. Our government is not the creator, but the
created. Our popular sovereignty has a common interest at stake, to
protect the individual by the government,6' and to protect the individual
from the government. The sovereign's will can be served only by
allowing the individual to vindicate a right against the government in
its courts and not by denying it. The consent is congenital and implicit.
This is the whole foundation for the justiciable issue on constitution-
ality. It is the hub of our system of government.' That it would be
the regular and due process of the law removed the terror, otherwise
common, that the unholy trinity of the hydraheaded king-sovereign-
crown again could appear. It was not ligan with our government as
the buoy. It was banished. The suable defendant advances to the
contour of government. The sovereign remains immune, but the
verminous crown-cell which short circuited relief is aborted. The
party at fault is disclosed in causal chain as the responsible defendant,
our good-faith government.
When the United States went into business, almost the first prob-
lem which came before its courts is the one We are pursuing. Just
looking at what then was done, the action discloses that it finally had
harnessed government accountability. States came to the federal court
against individuals; states accepted without question suability by
individuals; and, when they disdained, as sovereigns, such liability,
they were held in firm accountability, indisputably bound.'
C.
The earliest general discussion of the American principles is had in
these cases. Chisholm v. Georgia is a tremendous document.
The case is too simply stated. An action was brought in a
federal court against a state by an individual of another state. The
state defendant refused to appear on the merits claiming no liability
to such an action because it was a sovereign state. With great thor-
oughness, Mr. Justice Iredell dissenting, pointed out that "[t]he
61. See note 30 supra.
62. See note 55 supra.
63. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 1 (1794); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793); Oswald v. New York, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 415 (1793);
Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 402 (1792) ; Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2
U.S. (2 Dal.) 401 (1791).
64. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793). With due respect to all concerned, if one will
take the time for the soul trying labor of really studying this case, doubt will arise
as to whether most of our interpreters of this and some other problems of this gov-
ernment ever have really studied it. The labor is an invitation to use digest conclu-
sions as it is "just an old case anyhow" and the result is so simply stated that the
occasion to study it does not appear. The results look as if the study started with
castigations of later fashioning. See note 57 supra.
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suability of a state without its consent, was a thing unknown to the law
... . It was fully shown by an exhaustive examination of the old
law by Mr. Justice Iredell . . .; and it has been conceded in every
case since, where the question has, in any way been presented . . ." I
The record is a very different story. The case was submitted and
decided in full recognition that ours was new law and a new state;
that our state serves the sovereign people and is not the king-sovereign-
crown of the old law. Set up to establish justice, the remedy is
reciprocal between government and the individual and includes any
fault or obligation which government may incur. The rights of
individuals and the justice due to them, are as dear and precious as
the rights of the governments. Indeed, the latter are founded upon
the former; and the great end and object of them must be to secure
and support the rights of individuals, or else vain is government.
(As we go along, it should be kept in mind that the crown was immune
whether the suit was delictual or contractual.) The justices who
spoke for the court served in the Constitutional Convention or par-
ticipated in the Federalist."o The able presentation of the dissent
fixes the attention of the court to the issue, and gives force to its
judgment. The majority opinion discloses that the purpose of our
scheme of government was to blast the "old law" immunity. The
new order was clear-suability." Justice is not measured by numbers
or by position. It is measured by law and law appraises the consequence
of fault. The refusal to admit the wrong does not disprove the cause
of action." As both parties appear in the court of their common
sovereign, there can be no degrading, as would have happened to the
sovereign-crown if it were compelled to submit to a subject's judg-
ment. Government could commit fault; and, if so, the injured in-
dividual could sue for compensation.
69
65. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S, 1, 16 (1890). See note 57 supra.
66. It is also true that Mr. Justice Iredell was no boy.
67. The social compact concept abhorred the breach of obligation by government
as a violation of natural right. A popular government must translate its responsibility
in good faith. We raised ours to establish justice. The popular sovereign's courts have
jurisdiction to hold government accountable in fault.
68. All defendants deny liability.
69. Even Mr. Justice Iredell admits that there could be a, right against the gov-
ernment, as he approves the case of Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 DaU.) 401
(1791). In a like vein, the common assumption of federal jurisdiction of states as the
established norm is disclosed in the routine review of state courts by the Supreme
Court of the United States followed without question in seventeen cases. It was not
until 1816, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), that federaljurisdiction was questioned by State rights with the resulting declaration that the fed-
eral judicial power, like the other great federal powers, was supreme. See also, Able-
man v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859) and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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VI.
A.
The next phase of the story draws explanation from diverse
sources. When judicial process was raised to judicial power in balanc-
ing departmentalization, it was achieved both as to the new government
and to the federation by the general clause containing all cases arising
under the constitution; and the obvious corollary, a clearing house for
national questions, was supplied by constitutionally providing for the
Supreme Court. There had been doubt whether to have a national
judiciary. While that doubt was thus disposed of, it was not resolved
by removing control of its general exercise by constitutional stipulation.
The power was so provided, but the exercise was reserved. The
appellate jurisdiction for federal questions and the establishment of
inferior courts and their jurisdiction were withheld to legislation. Two
domestic types of non-federal cases did find prefixation in federal
jurisdiction, namely, suits between citizens of different states and
between states and citizens of other states. By and large, all federal
questions were held in state courts subject to the corrective, appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Such claims had to be pursued in
the state courts and taken to the Supreme Court for review of the
federal question under section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.70 This
was based on the established state courts, they were local courts; it
gave the states the first look, and it allayed fears 'of state-absorption
by the novel government. Reluctance to surrender control was natural.
In the several cases where federal jurisdiction was found necessary
it was stipulated. When the dangers compelling the nation-building
diminished after the war,71 jealousy of the central power increased. 2
The contract clause gave pause to state defaults, but not the inclination
for them."h When Chisholm v. Georgia disclosed that the states had
provided a means to hold themselves to performance of duty to indi-
viduals, the spirit of ninety-three jumped at the suggestion of Mr.
Chief Justice Jay that they could recall the grant of federal jurisdiction
by amendment if they chose. They did, post haste.74  The eleventh
70. Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20 § 25, 1 STAT. 85.
71. See note 55 supra.
72. Early versions of out-of-the-trenches-by-Christmas did no more good then
than now.
73. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), recognizes the principle
of fault which precludes the enumeration from being exclusory.
74. The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CoNST. amend. XI. The eleventh amendment was proposed by Congress on March 4,
1794. It became effective February 7, 1795. Georgia, the ninth of the twelve neces-
sary, did not ratify until November 29, 1794.
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amendment was conceived out of resentment and alarm. States rights
cries were the sounds of the hour. The federal jurisdiction was despised
and feared as .alien. This they wrote in selfish interest. There is no
attack upon the federal structure. There is no denial of government
liability for fault. There is only the hauling home of the tongs by
which the victim could pick the fat from the home fires to heal his
wounds. The federal judicial power "shall not be construed" to house
this type of relief. The purpose was to seal that door. In so far as
Hans v. Louisiana " and Monaco v. Mississippi 76 are concerned only
with the eleventh amendment, they are indisputable.7' The error of
Hans v. Louisiana is not in the decision of the court, but in the
extracurricular expression of Mr. Justice Bradley.78 The eleventh
amendment is not concerned with whether there is a cause of action
against a state, but only that such a cause of action cannot come into
the federal courts. Indisputably, there was such a cause of action.79
Obviously, Georgia did not consider itself King James. Indeed, it
never has.' In Hans, it is none of the court's business whether a
cause of action existed against the state, but only that the federal
courts had no jurisdiction of such a claim. There was no jurisdiction
of the issue of right because once characterized as a suit commenced
or prosecuted against a state by an individual non-resident the rug was
pulled from under it. The determination of the character was the end
of the jurisdiction.8 ' In Chisholm, the court did have jurisdiction of
75. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
76. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
77. Monaco v. Mississippi, supra note 76 has the national prerogative in foreign
relations to buttress. That alone probably would be a sufficient independent ground
under the reasoning of the case. As the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan points
out the diatribe at Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), in Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), is spurious and irrelevant.
78. See note 77 supra.
79. See notes 63, 70 supra.
80. Regents v. Blanton, 49 Ga. App. 602, 176 S.E. 673 (1934). See also Low v.
Towns, 8 Ga. 360 (1850). When war debts began to threaten, back-sliding was exten-
sive. Georgia Military Institute v. Simpson, 31 Ga. 273 (1860). Low v. Towns has
no difficulty in recognizing the difference in declaring judicially a plaintiff's legal right
and the barrier of departmentalization to its enforcement. The same adjustment in
government machinery has equal force of reason in our inquiry. Execution on judg-
ment is a very different problem than adjudication on right.
81. "The second section of the third article of the constitution defines the extent
of the judicial power of the United States. Jurisdiction is given to two classes of
cases. In the first, their jurisdiction depends on the character of the cause, whoever
may be the parties... This clause extends the jurisdiction of the court to all the cases
described without making in its terms any exception whatever, and without any regard
to the condition of the party. If there be any exception, it is to be implied against the
express words of the article.
"In the second class, the jurisdiction depends entirely on the character of the
parties. . .If these be the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject
of the controversy. Be it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come
into the courts of the Union." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821).
NOVEMBER 1956]
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol2/iss1/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the suit and it adjudicated the existence of the right. The eleventh
amendment walled-off the latter issue from Hans.
B.
Through Chisholm, there was a right of action for our individual
against the government of the state and he had a stage for his show.
All that is objectionable in this is that the right was a state right and
the forum was federal.8 2  Our plaintiff did not prosper. The eleventh
amendment slammed the stage door in his face. The motivation of
the states for this destaging constitutional maneuver led them also to
the withdrawal of the local stage for such use.' While occluded at
this point, our postulate again finds sunny weather, but the highway is
rough and progress often stalled by missing bridges carried off by
upstream floods.
VII.
A.
We wrote things into the Constitution; and we wrote things out of
the Constitution. As Hans was talking through its hat about Chisholm,
what it said is not so frightening as the propaganda effect it had to
corrode our cause of action. The claim of filial adhesion by Mr.
Justice Bradley to King James' sovereign immunity seems like a
modern Helios fanning a right-consuming coal into a spontaneous
combustion; and the modern Zeus who strikes him down again is our
principle of popular sovereignty. The thunderbolt used is another
constitutional amendment.8 4 A cause of action by an individual against
a state again is in the federal jurisdiction. It is broader than Chisholm's
type in that the plaintiff is freed of a territorial condition. It is a
narrower one for two reasons, firstly, it now derives from a national
source; and, secondly, its scope or content, for the same reason, is
82. This is not exclusory of a state forum. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 378 (1798), should be given comparative study on sovereignty, government,
and the suability of government confirmed in perspective in the first case under the
eleventh amendment.
83. See note 80 supra. Cf. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14 which says: "[t]he State of
Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." See also,
Alabama Girls Industrial School v. Reynolds, 143 Ala. 579, 42 So. 114 (1904).
84. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." The fourteenth amendment was sub-
mitted by Congress in June, 1866. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. It was ratified July,
.1868.
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constricted to federal rights. It does -not replace or constrict the other
cause of action. It is simply a new and a different cause of action.
B.
To sense the operation of the new cause of action in our dual
form of government (states and federal), it is necessary to retrace some
of the features of its gestation and connect them with the reorganization
of 1868. In the first place, the stipulation in a new constitutional
provision alone would not put the new cause of action in'the federal
courts.8 5 The Constitution and statute law must concur to give juris-
diction to a federal trial court. The Constitution must enable Congress
to invest the power, and then Congress actually must confer it to give
jurisdiction. The Constitution must have given the courts capacity
to take jurisdiction and the Congress must have supplied it. The
general provisions of law for federal jurisdiction 8' are based upon the
principle that "the judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States
made under their authority." 81 This was intended as a con-
stitutional definition of the judicial power which Congress could confer
upon courts of its creation without ousting state courts of concurrent
jurisdiction. This jurisdiction over federal questions was left in the
states 88 by the judiciary act of 1789, and remained there until 1875,"°
when the power was exercised broadly to invest the inferior federal
courts, concurrently with the state courts, with original jurisdiction of
all suits arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. °
C.
The folly of Fort Sumter detonated the explosive fumes which
had seeped into all political tissue as Harriet's eloquence set fire to
reason. The war between the states was directed at restoring the
understanding that the covenant of union, was immutable-to cancel
the eleven secessions. It was the continuing force of cohesion against
the assertion of state sovereign choice of segmentation. Though,
85. See notes 70, 71 supra.
86. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter . . .arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952).
87. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
88. See note 70 supra.
89. Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 STAT. 470.
90. In the Act of Feb. 13, 1801, c. 4, 2 STAT. 89 the power was recognized but the
jurisdiction given was withdrawn by the Act of March 8, 1802, c. 8, 2 STAT. 132,
which restored the act of 1789. See Tennessee v. Union Bank, 152 U.S. 459 (1894).
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clearly there were centrifugal impulses which pulled at other areas,
the great throught-welding catalytic agent was the purpose of emanci-
pation, and attention gravitated to the primary area of its application.
We know and have noted that when the union was formed, it was
formed from sovereign states each a bit jealous of its own interests and
fearful of the novel government arising from the union. Every force
was reversed and this was expressed in the reorganization covenants
of 1865, 1868, and 1870. The first finally made legal what was made
only formal by the proclamation of the president. The last catches
on tardily to give political voice to citizens. The big dog in the whole
race, again, as in the beginning,9' is the sanctity of the individual, his
person and his property.92 If these were to continue within state
discretion,' the travail of the horrible civil war would have been in
vain. There was no expectation that the recaptured states would be
happy to embrace the subject matter and the policy of emancipation.9 4
From the viewpoint of the union, recidivism by them was the expect-
able. The passion of the war found vehicle in the union and expressed
itself against states, albeit, seceding states. When the nation was
created, states feared the union-they would take care of their own
inhabitants. Now, the union is the trusted intimate. The state is the
government feared, and how they would take care of the subject of the
emancipation! What was lost on the battle field would be recaptured
by the state governments through legislation or otherwise. This is why
there had to be a reorganization of our dual scheme of government. 95
The plan was simple, namely, write a floor under state discretion and
suspend it from the nation. The fourteenth amendment gave the
individual a federal right that the state should not push him below
the declared minimum. It is as if there was a new constitution, the
position is reversed in giving an individual a federal right against his
own state. To do this, it was necessary to attach allegiance to the
nation, and to follow it with special and general relief. The first
comes in the second privileges and immunities clause 96 to secure that
which flows to him from his new found affinity to the United States.
Then comes the glorious generalization translating to the individual
91. See note 33 supra.
92. The heat of the battle field had evaporated the mist of state supremacy as to
the secession.
93. See note 40 supra.
94. The thirteenth amendment was proposed and ratified in 1865. The fourteenth
amendment was proposed in the following June.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
96. The nation-building fourth article privileges and immunities clause gave prece-
dence to the forum State.
[VOL. 2: p. 16
25
Smith: Government Accountability
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1956
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
that vast residuum which fundamental principles of ordered liberty in
a free people articulate as the due or ordinary process of law. The
lessons of the first privileges and immunities clause taught that the
discretion of the forum state measures the federal right of the visiting
individual. Here, the purpose was to make the federal floor primary
and not conditional, and so the necessity of the added equal protection
clause not thought necessary to the function of the parent fifth.97
The duty of the state to level on the federal level was not left aleatory.
D.
The non-use of federal courts for federal questions was not due
to a lack of awareness of their availability in congressional discretion."
The use of the removal device seems best to disclose the evolution.
Protection of federal offices, e.g., revenue, from hostile forums was
the basic concern in these provisions, but they extended also to private
persons. The non-intercourse act of 1815 resulting from local resist-
ance to the war of 1812 brought temporary relief to customs officers.99
The threat of nullification gave a permanent relief provision to officers
or persons on account of acts done under the customs laws."°  The
sixties brought increased use.'01 The civil rights acts originated in
state courts with removal privilege.102  Enforcement of voting rights
was made removable in 1871."~ The failure to grasp immediately
the tremendous implications of this new amendment was not due only
to the excitement of the times.' The civil rights acts moved toward
it by attrition. They gave original as well as removal jurisdiction for
all causes affecting persons who were denied or could not enforce in
97. While it may be there, here, the explicit was essential to the pressing purpose,
and it was not enough to abide the implicit.
98. Minor use was made: 1789 gave use for penalties and forfeitures incurred
under federal laws and alien torts in violation of international law or a treaty, Judici-
ary Act of 1789, c. 20, § 9. 1 STAT. 77; patent interests, Act of April 10, 1790, c. 8, § 5,
1 STAT. 111; Act of Feb. 21, 1793, c. 11, § 5, 1 STAT. 322; Act of March 19, 1792, c.
10, § 2, 1 STAT. 244. The declaration of political mortgage by the Federalist Party
(see note 70 supra) followed the language of the Constitution, and allowed for removal
and required no jurisdictional amount, Act of Feb. 13, 1801, c. 4, § 13, 2 STAT. 92. It
was expunged less than thirteen months later, Act of March 8, 1802, c. 8, 2 STAT. 132.
99. Non-Intercourse Act of 1815, c. 21, § 8, 3 STAT. 195.
100. Act of March 2, 1833, c. 57, 4 STAT. 632.
101. The sixties brought increased use for officers and others for acts committed
during the conflict and justified under the authority of the president or congress, Act
of March 3, 1863, c. 80, 12 STAT. 755. The measures of 1833 were confirmed in a series
of acts from 1864 to 1866, and evolve into 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1) and (a) (2) (1952).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1952) begins there. The original statutes referred to pro-
ceedings against federal officers or persons acting under them.
103. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, c. 96, § 15, 16 STAT. 438.
104. It is not realized yet. Cf., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 483 (1954),
and the reaction thereto.
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state courts any rights given by the first act."°5 In 1870, federal juris-
diction was provided for all causes, civil or criminal, arising under the
act. Damages were added in 1871 and recovery could be had in the
federal courts.
E.
The ebullition gained temper and color as they sought to syn-
cretize emancipation and civil rights. The whole suddenly seemed to
jell in form in the last civil rights act, 106 and the reconstruction of the
federal jurisdiction concept. The union sentiment consolidated in
the positive purpose of making the nation's courts the primary forum
for the, vindication of federal rights. The judiciary act of 1875 flung
open the doors and swept in the whole federal scheme by using the
constitutional language, "all suits of a civil nature, at common law
or in equity, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority." 107
In 1787, the need of having available a power to interpret the
legal interests created was appreciated. In this sense, the judiciary
clause o8 was drafted in terms "shall extend to" federal questions.
Its extension was stipulated by constitutional provision for non-
residents against a state. The eleventh amendment terminated this
by stipulating that "the judicial power . . . shall not be construed
to extend" to any right against a state.'0 9 Now, that is restored." °
The fourteenth amendment speaks to the individual and directly vests
him with an original federal right against the state and it speaks for
the individual by imposing a duty upon the state to forbear its
destruction."' With the conscious purpose of making the provision
105. These provisions are reflected in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344, 1443 (1952). Na-
tional bank cases came into the federal courts in 13 STAT. 99, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp.
1955) ; federal incorporations, Act of July 27, 1868, c. 255, 15 STAT. 226; treble dam-
age cases for discriminatory rail rates, 18 STAT. 111, 43 U.S.C.A. § 867 (Supp. 1955).
Other minor provisions dealt with original and removal jurisdiction.
106. Act of March 1, 1875, c. 114, 18 STAT. 335.
107. Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 STAT. 470. There was a $500 jurisdictional
amount and a provision for expulsion at any time if it appeared such suit did not
really involve federally derived rights.
108. See note 87 supra.
109. See note 74 supra.
110. See note 85 supra.
111. See note 95 supra. The thirteenth amendment niade certain that the proclama-
tion of emancipation is valid. The Congress had been working on the civil rights acts
but doubt arose as to their constitutionality. Two actions were taken, the Constitution
is rewritten to contain them, and, after the fourteenth amendment is effective, the civil
rights legislation is reenacted.
[VOL. 2: p. 16
27
Smith: Government Accountability
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1956
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
operative," 2 the congress enacted the means set out in the judiciary
act of 1875. The individual was invited to vindicate his right directly
against the state at fault, and the federal stage was provided for its
expression. The porcupine that has crawled into the cast is the fetish
of Ex parte Young." 3 We should exorcise it, if we can, or at least
pluck its quills so that it no longer blocks access to the party at fault." 4
VIII.
A.
The fourteenth amendment expressly selects the wrongdoer whose
fault is denounced. It is the government of the state. It recognizes
that government is a unit. That it may exert itself through various
channels does not change its identity." 5 The amendment centralized
the national government in that the individual took rights directly
from it, and it was made federal, as distinguished from confederate, to
a much greater degree than probably could have been done at any other
time. The United States did not become a municipal government. It
could not treat of legal relations between individuals as such."' The
amendment vested an original federal right in the individual of which
the state could not "deprive" him. The great and indisputable core
of the whole is that, if state conduct is not involved, there just is no
fourteenth amendment cause of action. Though this may shrivel the
spirit of Mr. Justice Iredell, it is ineluctable. Unless we can give it
rest through reason, we shall continue to have results expressed in
spiritualism; for while Ex parte Young gets some of the results, it is
phrased in the spirit of Mr. Justice Iredell, fluted by Mr. Justice
Bradley through Hans.
That error can become accepted in repetition is mirrored in the
passive adoption of a leading authority on torts in his popular book.
112. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5. See also Article III, § 1;
Article III, §2.
113. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
114. We shall return to this. In the meantime, the background material must be
noticed.
115. "State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms. And when the effect of
that action is to deny rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it is the obligation of this Court to enforce the constitutional commands." Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378
(1798), should be given comparative study on sovereignty, government, and the suabil-
ity of government confirmed in perspective in the first case under the eleventh amend-
ment.
116. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) ; Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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"Neither the United States nor any of the several states may
be sued by a private citizen without its consent, and the latter are
expressly protected from suit by the Eleventh Amendment to the
Federal Constitution . . . Even where the possibility of a suit
against the state is authorized . . . it usually is held that the
state is not liable for its torts. The immunity is said to rest upon
public policy, the absurdity of a wrong committed by an entire
people, the idea that whatever the state does is lawful, and the
rather doubtful theory that an agent of the state is always outside
of the scope of his authority when he commits a wrongful act." 117
To "honor thy father and thy mother" truly is a counsel of
virtue. Mr. Justice Iredell profaned his political father ("founding
fathers"), and his idolatrous approval of king-sovereign-crown has
been propagandized to such an extent that the Plimsoll line of right
has been submerged. To such imagery, this paper is iconoclastic.
B.
We have seen, the founding principles preserving sovereign im-
munity, but thrusting the agent government forward to meet, in the
common decency of reciprocal obligation, the recognized standards
of responsibility. The states covenanted in constitutional provision for
the restoration of the mauled individual by providing for suit against
them in the federal courts. This did not write a rule of liability. What
then, were they talking about? Unless it was understood that the
fault of a state was actionable, there could have been no action to be
brought anywhere, federal court or no; and certainly the states did
speak of causes "between a State and Citizens of another State," and
they explained it in the eleventh amendment as any "suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one . . ." of them. They
did not do this in respect for King James or for George III. There
is every reason to understand that they did not intend to make James'
sovereign-crown the United States government when they moved, as a
sovereign people (WE THE PEOPLE), to establish justice, domestic
tranquility and the blessings of liberty by means of the novel govern-
ment which must pay its debts and discharge its obligations for the
general welfare. The amendments of 1791 confirmed that which was
implicit in the original text of the Constitution, so that such should
not be lost to memory. That these implied rights be made explicit was
a condition of ratification. The draftsman of these amendments had
117. PRossmii, TORTS, 770 771 (2d ed. 1955). He continues: "A public officer, of
course, cannot be held liable for doing in a proper manner an act which is commanded
or authorized by a valid law." Id. at 104.
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vivid recollection of a recent dramatic reminder in Entick v. Car-
rington.n 8 We have no ergometer to measure their thought labors
other than to observe the great pressures. We do have the resultant
of forces. The preparation of the first ten amendments was undertaken
and they were presented by the first congress as a matter of course with
the further assurances that this new government should not become
a sovereign-crown monster. The Bill of Rights covenanted with each
individual that none shall "be deprived" of his rights. 9 The matter
was considered.
C.
When the states wanted to default, being held to account for injury
to the individual was not pleasant. While they loosened the grip of
the federal courts by the municipal device of withdrawing suit, there
is no place where they say there is no cause or no fault. All that was
necessary to escape accountability was to say no suit; and, as long as
that failed to be recognized as unconstitutional, the goal would be
served. Both fault and suit of the state were recognized at the
beginning. After 1793, the entire judicial power of the United States
did not extend to a suit against a state unless it gave its consent.
Nowhere does the giving of consent create the right or originate the
fault. The suspended right derived from fault is allowed expression
only when consent is given. The right always was there, but the
remedy was withheld." The congress of 1793, recognized that rights
in the individual existed against the government of the United States.'
The laconic comment that "while the exemption of the United States
and of the several States from being subjected as defendants to ordinary
actions in the courts, has . . been repeatedly asserted here, the
principle has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, but
118. 19 St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). It involved the general warrant.
John Adams thundering against the iniquitous writs of assistance, cousin to the gen-
eral warrant, was heard throughout length and breadth of the colonies. Of the crown's
use of the general warrant, Lord Camden says: "And with respect to the argument of
state necessity, or a distinction that has been aimed at between state offenses and
others, the common law does not understand that kind of reasoning, nor do our books
take notice of such distinctions." Id. at 1073. No charge had been brought against the
individual.
119. The guaranty of a republican form of government to the states was to make
sure that if James or George III should become the chief of one state that the others
would go down and kite him home.
120. "The immunity from suit belonging to a state ... is a personal privilege
which it may waive at pleasure." Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883). The no
remedy no right argument does not work. A statute of limitations may have the same
operation.
121. When the action was brought by the government, the outstanding right of
the individual could be "admitted upon trial" if it had been turned down by the auditor.
See 28 U.S.C. §2406 (1952).
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it.has always been treated as an established doctrine" still was possible
nearly one hundred years later.122  It seems to be true that congress
failed to stipulate a statutory grant of jurisdiction in the original
judiciary act as is indicated in the often misquoted phrasing of Chief
Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia.'23 Unless there was such a
cause, even though it could not get into the federal courts, there would
be no occasion to talk about waiver of immunity. The Chief .Justice
speaks of waiver.'24 In regard to State liability, he repeatedly stated
that "a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States,
is cognizable in the courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties." 125
United States v. McLemore 2 and Hill v. United States,1 7 often are
cited as upholding the plea of immunity by the United States. What-
ever may have been said loosely in these opinions, there was an
element of res adjudicata inherent and there was the advisory opinion
in each that law, not equity, was the place for remedy.
The federal courts did not have any cases on federal questions
until after 1875. Their first big job was the initial analysis on the
merits of the proposition of federal government immunity. In the
first case of substance the action was allowed the same as it was
against the state. 2 ' As just about everything has been said of the case,
this is a place to let it speak for itself. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Gray
says: "The sovereign is not liable to be sued in any judicial tribunal
without its consent"; as it can hold property only through its agents,
a suit against them is a suit against it; and, to invade their possession,
"is to invade the possession of the sovereign, and to disregard the
fundamental maxim that the sovereign cannot be sued." 129 From
122. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882). There was no discussion
because Chisholm disclosed liability was commonly understood and there was no argu-
ment which could challenge it. That was true also of other clauses, i.e., full faith and
credit, until some unintended twist gave a foothold. See Smith, The Constitution and
the Conflict of Laws, 27 Ggo. L.J. 536 (1939).
123. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). The absence of provision in the statute
excuses the government from responding: "The universally received opinion is, that
no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary
act does not authorize such suits." Id. at 411, 412. (Italics added). "If the question
cannot be brought into a court, then there is no case in law or equity and no jurisdic-
tion is given by the words of the article." Id. at 405.
124. Id. at 308.
125. Id. at 383, 392. Hans put the nip on this federal question feature of jurisdic-
tion when the state was defendant.
126. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
127. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386 (1850).
128. The facts are simple enough: in ejectment, individuals seek to recover lands
claimed by the government. It was brought against government agents in occupancy
and control of the land. For the government, the attorney general interposed specific
objection to the maintenance of the action. Judgment for the plaintiffs was upheld.
Lee v. United States, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
129. Id. at 226. This was Mr. Justice Gray's first important decision on the court.
See his opinion in Briggs v. Light Boats, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 157 (1865).
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without and from within, the proposition was forced for a decision:
the possession was the possession of the government, and the govern-
ment could not be sued without its consent.' The majority of the
court recognized that the government was in possession, it could be
sued for wrongful possession, and it was ejected:
"cas no person in this government exercises supreme executive
power, or performs the public duties of a sovereign, it is difficult
to see on what solid foundation of principle the exemption from
liability to suit rests. It seems most probable that it has been
adopted in our courts as a part of the general doctrine of publicists,
that the supreme power of every State, wherever it may reside,
shall not be compelled, by process of courts of its own creation, to
defend itself from assaults in those courts.
"On the other hand, %rhile acceding to the general proposition
that in no court can the United States be sued directly by original
process as a defendant, there is abundant evidence in the decisions
of this court that the doctrine, if not absolutely limited to cases in
which the United States are made defendants by name, is not
permitted to interfere with the judicial enforcement of the estab-
lished rights of plaintiffs when the United States is not a defendant
or a necessary party to a suit.
"Looking at the question upon principle, and apart from the
authority of adjudged cases, we think it still clearer that this
branch of the defense cannot be maintained. It seems to be
opposed to all the principles upon which the rights of the citizen,
when brought in collision with the acts of the government, must
be determined. In such cases there is no safety for the citizen,
except in the protection of the judicial tribunals, for rights which
have been invaded by the officers of the government, professing to
act in its name. There remains to him but the alternative of
resistance, which may amount to crime." '81
The only exception to the recognition that there always is a
cause where there is government fault, though accountability may
be avoided, appears in The Western Maid132 and a few other
cases wherein Mr. Justice Holmes spoke for the court. His argument
rests .upon an absence of underlying obligation. However, this does
not stand up, even for him. In United States v. Thekla, 8 3 the cross
claim against the plaintiff government was allowed. It was there all
the time. The defendant could not get through the door alone; but,
130. But even all the vigor of emphasis of which Mr. Justice Gray was capable
does not depute fault of the government. It contends only that it cannot be called un-
willingly to account.
131. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206, 207, 218, 219. See also The Davis,
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15 (1868); The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868).
132. 257 U.S. 419 (1922).
133. 266 U.S. 328 (1924).
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when the government opened it to reach him, he then could strike back
with his own preexisting right, and the government must account to
him.134
Ix.
A.
That ideas may be free does not mean that they must be followed.
Mr. Justice Iredell 15 was sound in his dissent in Chisholm. The
decision of the court was not worthy of recognition even as heresy
under the King James version of sovereign-crown. The only thing
(and the whole thing) the matter with this is that a new orthodoxy
of political faith in American constitutional dogma replaced it. The
sovereign was the people and the defendant in Entick v. Carrington
and the Case of Earl Danby was the government." 6 We are not
trained in code thinking. Ours is the positive thinking of societal
growth-the positive thinking of the common law. The positive law,
code thinking, escapes us. x3 7 We conceived and recognized suability
of the government, but we did not spell it out; we did not spread it
out in graphic form. Three situations result.
B.
Two causes of action exist against the government of the state
and one against the government of the nation. The same fundamental
reason underlies the due process action against the government of the
state and the federal government; but one arises under the state system
and the other arises under the national scheme. It, thus, may be
said that the first is under state law and the other under national law.
In each, the situation is epicene. Every one seems to feel that govern-
ment ought to account for its fault. The few exceptions do more to
prove than to dispute. Somehow, eulogy of the spirit of King James
occludes the bridge to direct action. But we swim for it, and obtain
134. Accord, United States v. Louisiana, 123 U.S. 32, 35 (1887), saying, "The
action before us, being one in which the United States has consented to be sued, falls
within those designated, to which the judicial power extends; for, as already stated,
both of the demands in controversy arise under the laws of the United States." See
also, Alabama v. United States, 325 U.S. 535 (1945); Florida v. United States, 282
U.S. 194 (1931) ; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373 (1902). In Ward v. Love
County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920), the court assumes an inherent right under one or the
other due process clause and this gives a cause of action for a tortious fault.
135. And his disciple, Mr. Justice Gray who gets called a nationalist, for what-
ever reason, when he takes it up in Lee, and Mr. Justice Bradley in Hans.
136. The real heresy is the dissertation of Iredell.
137. We write codes to put sense into pleading, striving to bury forms of common
law actions-yet, they rule us from their graves.
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by some legerdemain "an agent is not an agent" and "wrongful acts
of government are not government action" (good old "king can do
no wrong"). This makes us write stuff like the prolific Ex parte
Young.'38 The result is that for the two inherent causes on common
right or due process, we have tended to paint ourselves into corners.
If either government chooses, it can insulate itself from suit.l"9 Even
when it has not done so, the cases tend to assume that it has. Then
they try to get around something that isn't there. The new fourteenth
amendment cause may cast out the mote. At any event, it is very
real and one that cannot be barred by the defendant state. It is the
second cause of action against the government of the state. We
have written it by positive law into the constitution, and have articulated
it through concurring federal court jurisdiction, congressionally
conferred.
C.
When we were writing the constitution, of course, the question
pressed as to whom the task of holding conformity therewith should
be given, congress, the president, etc. We settled it in the judicial
power which was extended to everything within justiciable character
that arose under national law. When the war between the states
turned in favor of the union, it had the problem of enforcing emanci-
pation. Then, as yet, there is an amorphous state-of-seige device to
maintain municipal discipline, which could have been used. The power
to enforce emancipation could have been given to the president or done
in many ways. It might have been left to government initiative to
bring suit. However, traditionally, we turned to the judicial power
and gave the individual a right to have federal court help to stop
everything that would be a deprivation prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment when done by a state. Two fundamental elements com-
prise this federal right in the individual to be free from the deprivation.
The first is that the claim is in regard to an interest within the scope
of the new amendment of 1868. The second is that the wrongdoer
must be a government of state as that is understood in our federal
system. If these exist, and to the extent that their application is
involved, obviously, the eleventh amendment is repealed."4 It does
138. Before we mustered courage to strike the truth, Hitler got us to agree that
Mussolini and Togo were tall, blond, and nordic. When he said the Norwegian was
not nordic, we saw the bridge and ran for it. The stampede will start here too when
we see through Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
139. The invalidity of this is a subject of separate treatment.
140. If either is missing, good old Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) still has
a fox hole.
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not follow from this that the action of the court in Hans was
groundless.' 41
D.
We have observed that Chief Justice Marshall did not consider
that the eleventh amendment immunized the government of the state
from causes of action claimed to be derived from federal source. Hans
correctly holds that it does. When Chisholm showed the duty to
account there was no back-log of actionable, delictual fault outstanding,
but whole lumber yards full of contractual causes (bonds, etc.) were
floating at the states from all directions. They just did not want to
be sued by an individual in a federal court-an alien court on whose
throttle they had no hand. The federal covenant dealt with contracts.
There is nothing in the eleventh amendment which even savors of re-
moving or modifying the contract clause. They did not care about
the character of the cause, it was the character of the party they
wanted to blood-hound out of any ambush. Hans is right on an
eleventh amendment basis. But, if the fourteenth amendment reached
its objective, it is less than silly to talk of sovereign immunity. This
would be no less so if the states, qua states, were sovereign. The
people of the states, and so the states, covenanted to subject states
to an individual's action; and they moved in representative function
through the congress to stage the show. Every cause within the
scope of the fourteenth amendment is a character within that cast.'
How numerous the list, or how few, is not our primary concern here,
for certainly there are some. The same powers which put the state
government into the federal courts to defend itself are the powers that
used the eleventh amendment to relieve it of that responsibility. They
again came forward in 1868 to put it back. This time, it is a new right.
They gave both a cause and a designated defendant. The cause has
no limitation as to quality, i.e., whether delictual or contractual. It
141. An examination of the opinion discloses obvious extra-curricular contribu-
tion, personal to the prerogative of the justice who prepared the opinion, but wholly
outside the action of the court.
Chief Justice Ellsworth was a draftsman of the judiciary act. He was a prom-
inent member of the convention. A major issue of Chisholm also was in United States
v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 297 (1893). In both, Mr. Justice Iredell objected to the
jurisdiction. This may be the cue to his argument in Chisholm. Of the act, "It thus
appears that the first Congress, in which were many who had been leading and influ-
ential members of the Convention, and who were familiar with the discussions that
preceded the adoption of the Constitution by the states, and with the objections urged
against it, did not understand that the original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court
was necessarily exclusive." Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 464 (1884). The same
principle was involved in both Ravara and Chisholm as companion cases. See notes
123 and 129, supra. and also note 207, infra.
142. The content in terms of character of the cause must be developed elsewhere.
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was fault by the government of the state. The true mystery of con-
stitutional life is how a court can work a conjuration for the idea that
the crown-can-do-no-wrong. We entered revolution because we knew
it did us wrong. We had to innovate the constitutional scheme itself
because we knew that the state governments of the confederacy did do
wrong. We rewrote it in 1868 because we were certain they would
do wrongs, and we were determined to let the victim have his day
in a federal court to call them to account. 143  There has been recogni-
tion, including Chisholm, that actionable government conduct was
not confined to contract. There can be no doubt about the inclusion
of delictual fault in the fourteenth amendment. The subject matter
of emancipation was not the subject matter of contract. Just as
certainly as there is a Tombigbee River, there was no impelling idea
or primary purpose to protect the emancipated person only from loss
of contract rights."' It was predatory treatment not impairment of
contracts that was objectionable. Life, liberty, and property carry
a militant concern for the person.145 Again, while the heat of the
battle field may have steamed the union back together, it would not
preclude the constituent governments from taking it out on the person
if they regained their old sovereignty. 46 Contract was the primary
content of the eleventh amendment action; protection and relief from
tortious conduct was the primary content of the fourteenth amendment.
This was the main cause. The spur track' of the civil rights action rings
of the predatory.'47
E.
To get into the federal court, our federal cause of action against
state government must arise under the national law. 4 This issue
143. It is easy, probably ordinary, to see what we want to see or to assume that
we see it. The artist's visualization of the signing of the declaration of independence
never has been questioned. The flag on the wall is British, but we were not there to
honor King Georgel
If we had been willing to look at facts and had not imagined facts derived from
hope, we might not have staggered so far into the industrial desert after 1929. Hope
and assurances allowed us to believe the birds we saw were two chickens even after
the bottom fell out of the pot.
144. Some persons within the fourteenth amendment may not have had contrac-
tual capacity. Causes in regard to them were possessory, property actions. This is
where illegality questions attaching to executive emancipation arose, requiring the thir-
teenth amendment confirmation.
145. This does not exclude contract rights from generic property concepts. The
state government already was disabled to impair the obligation of a contract.
146. See note 40 supra.
147. It does not control, but it explains, as it is a supplemental remedy. See 28
U.S.C. § 1343 (1952). Cf., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952).
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seems guided generally by three cases.' 49 Broadly, they provide that
a case so arises whenever its correct decision depends upon the con-
struction of a federal source, and it does not matter by which party
the federal authority is put forward. One of the federal sources must
be the foundation of the cause. In Louisville & N. R. R. v. Mottley,
the federal jurisdiction fails because the foundation of the cause of
action was the contract and its breach. The substantial question must
be whether the state conduct violates the federal rule. A case so
arises when either party's right depends upon the federal source.'"
F.
In this connection, another epicene feature appears in the cases
which is complicated by the failure to distinguish the special explicit
cause of action against the state and the implicit cause against the federal
government. The first shades without demarcation between a pro-
cedural bar which may be inserted against the individual's right
against the state and the Holmes' absence-of-cause proposition. And
again without differentiation, this confusion is carried over into the
cases against the federal government which are dismissed on the
theory of indispensable party or because the action, in substance, is
against the federal government (which, King-like, cannot be sued.) "'
Observing only the concept "sovereign," it is far more unthinkable
to sue the everybody, of our popular sovereignty, at once, than the
untouchable body of the King. There has to be some concentration
of personality to a reachable person for the same reason that one
cannot slander a race. Objectivity and fixation of responsibility
require the pushing up, out of the nascent, of the agent government
to give and take. Convenience gives conventional address to this
agent, representative of state, as if it were the state. 1"2 Two things,
149. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) ; Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824) ; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821).
150. The jurisdiction is one for initial decision and must be determined before
the court can continue. There is elaborate discussion of this problem in West Coast
Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582, (D.C. Cir. 1954) cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989
(1954).
151. The bar of indispensable party, pinpointed in Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S.
490 (1947), seems now to be turning with the general drift to allow (willy-nilly) suit
against the government of the United States. In Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48
(1955), "practical considerations" point out that it is unlikely that any superior would
disregard a judicial decision invalidating an order; and that, even if the alien again
were arrested, the first decision would have to be considered by the reviewing court.
If this is not res adjudicata, it is cy pres, in any other language.
152. Within its agency, it might as well be. The term does have great pragmatism.
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), should be given comparative
study, on sovereignty, government, and the suability of government confirmed in per-
spective in the first case under the eleventh amendment.
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among many others, should aid in the identity of the creature for
fourteenth amendment actions against it. One long anticipates the
amendment, and the other is contemporary. Neither is conclusive
because the admixture is not constant. The eleventh used the word
state when it wanted to get the state government off the hook. The
fourteenth casts the harpoon at the state. As civil rights acts were
written by the same draftsmen at the same time, their lines could aid
survey. Revelation is found in tracing the fundamental process.
G.
The last mentioned mirrors the great principle of governance
binding duty and right with representation and authority and making
all a part of one government whose maker is the sovereign people and
whose soul is the fundamental concept of a free people under popular
government. Three significant cases catch its phosphorescence. They
are Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson,'" San Diego Land
and Town Company v. Jasper,"' and Regan v. Farmers' Loan and
Trust Company.'55 These and all powers and rights are made com-
parable in Munn v. Illinois.5 ' Our problem devolves from the
vaporous conclusions stopping the individual because he cannot sue
the crown. If the officer is acting within the will of the government,
suit must stop either because it is a suit against the government or,
perhaps, on the indispensable party label. We know that the state
can be sued because the constitution tells us so; but we are not sure,
from the cases, when we have the government on the line. That is what
these cases give us in situations where they really had to fish or cut
bait and go ashore. Brimson is a federal case, but the value of the case
is to identify "government." The contest revolved about the trial
court's refusal of process to bring a witness before the commission
because the judge thought it was beyond the judicial power, i.e., that
the commission was not acting for the government and the government
was a stranger. The power of the government to give the authority
to the agent
. . is beyond dispute. Upon everyone, therefore, who owes
allegiance to the United States, or who is within its jurisdiction,
enjoying the protection that its government affords, rests an
obligation to respect the national will as thus expressed in con-
formity with the Constitution. As every citizen is bound to
153. 154 U.S. 447 (1894), 155 U.S. 1 (1894) (dissent).
154. 189 U.S. 439 (1903).
155. 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
156. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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obey the law and to yield obedience to the constituted authorities
acting within the law, this power conferred upon the Commission
imposes upon anyone, summoned by that body to appear and to
testify, the duty of appearing and testifying, and upon anyone
required to produce such books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agree-
ments, and documents, the duty of producing them, if the testi-
mony is sought, and the books, papers, etc., called for, relate to
the matter under investigation, if such matter is one which the
Commission is legally entitled to investigate, and if the witness
is not excused on some personal ground, from doing what the
Commission requires at his hands. The propositions seem to be
so clear and indisputable that any attempt to sustain them by
argument would be of no value in the discussion. Whether the
Commission is entitled to the evidence it seeks, and whether the
refusal of the witness to testify or to produce books, papers, etc.,
in his possession, is or is not in violation of his duty or in deroga-
tion of the rights of the United States, seeking to execute a power
expressly granted to Congress, are the distinct issues between
that body and the witness. They are issues between the United
States and those who dispute the validity of an Act of Congress
and seek to obstruct its enforcement. And these issues, made in
the form prescribed by an act of Congress, are so presented that
the judicial power is capable of acting upon them. The question
so presented is substantially, if not precisely, that which would
arise if the witness was proceeded against by indictment under
an act of Congress declaring it to be an offense against the United
States for anyone to refuse to testify before the Commission
" 157
The agent is the state and the state is the agent no less in the Brimson
case.
158
H.
In the Reagan case, likewise there is a full appreciation that the
state is the agent." 9  The case, the first important one to come up
through the federal trial court, was brought to restrain the enforce-
157. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 476, 477 (1894).
(Emphasis added.)
158. They had to scrape off the foam in these cases or government would have
been split up the middle by departmentalization. Those areas shade at the borders:
"... There are matters involving public rights which may be presented in such form
that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of
judicial determination, but which Congress may or may not bring within the cog-
nizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper." Id. at 475. In our
problem, the failure to recognize the individual's claim against the government of the
state is to saw off the head from the body. We do not have courts for the sake of
courts. We have courts to accomplish the purpose of government, as we have legis-
latures, and executives. Cf., Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925) ; Michaelson v.
United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
159. What is not seen is that the eleventh amendment has been repealed to the
extent that the case is founded upon the fourteenth.
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ment of an order of an officer, an agent of the state government. The
court rejected the argument that the suit could not be brought in federal
jurisdiction, but it arrived at the result over a suspension bridge. By
this time, the new federal jurisdiction of 1875 is in full flower. Swift
v. Tyson 16o problems are having a federal field day. The progression
of federal jurisdiction under the companion section 161 reaches such
excess as demonstrated by Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co. 6' that it must have been
the hope of everyone who had a case that did not augur as fair sailing
in state courts." To this magnetism seems. to have been added an
attitude of hospitality by the federal court.' Perhaps, Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Company 165 discloses this best. The situation,
being one in which the cause is ripe for adjudication, becomes one of
strategy as to which court, state or federal, to try it.1 66  From Prentis,
we get a summary of the development from Reagan to Prentis, in
effect, that a federal claim in a state court would receive prejudiced
treatment, even to the findings of fact. The state court itself was
down-graded as inadequate to do justice because the federal right
to be protected from deprivation depended upon pure matters of fact
to such an extent that a de novo hearing of such facts in a federal
court was essential to the protection of constitutional rights. 67 Reagan
opened the doors and the stampede to the federal court was on.
The court found difficulty in getting the door ajar. Hans was
fresh out of the oven and this was a state and a state government
could not be sued by an individual. But it is not the absence of a right
against the state, it is the absence of a forum that was the trouble.
Probably, this is where Ex parte Young got its foot caught. The
court mounts the mole hill from the state's catapult. When the state
160. 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 1 (1842).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
162. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
163. There are two flare developments from the Reagan formation, (1) fact trials
de novo, and (2) abstention movements.
164. This must be said from looking at the results when it is borne in mind that
the eleventh is considered unmodified in its repellent aspect. The true repeal function
is unseen.
165. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
166. "It seems to us clear that the appellees [plaintiffs] were not bound to wait
for proceedings brought to enforce the rate and to punish them for departing from
it. Those, we have assumed in favor of the appellants would be proceedings in court
and could not be enjoined; while to confine the railroads to them for the assertion of
their rights would be to deprive them of part of those rights. If the railroads were
required to take no active steps until they could bring a writ of error from this court
to the Supreme Court of Appeals [of Virginia] after a final judgment, they would
come here with the facts already found against them." Id. at 228 (Emphasis added).
167. See. Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1914).
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government expressed its willingness to meet the plaintiff in the state
court, the fat was in the fire. "Of course," it could not hold a general
right to suit in its own court, so a right to sue any place becomes a
right to sue every place. A quasi consent is just as good as a true
one for federal jurisdiction, even if it will not do for contract.' 68
I.
It took quite a while to discover that, in these generalizations,
we were making the state a vassal in a manner foreign to the function
of the supremacy clause. Many of these cases arose from state public
utility regulation problems. Fundamentally, these are matters of
municipal police power, and their effectiveness is as important to the
federal plan as it is to the constituent state. The state structure is
complicated and the meaning and scope of the state laws may be
obscure. If one meaning is had, no federal concern attaches. If
another meaning is given, a federal right arises. The breach of federal
right is not disclosed until the state action is clarified. The federal
right thus is appendant, not primary. These usually are equity causes.
Injunction, the tool of equity, is not issued as a matter of course. It
follows only when damages are found inadequate, if it does not require
too much supervision to enforce, and where no other public policy
intervenes. The misuse of the injunction has called for disuse of
primary federal jurisdiction in this situation under the popular appella-
tion of the abstention doctrine. Mr. Justice Stone set it up.' 69  The
court has carried it through in Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 70 and Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern
Ry. Co.'7 ' This is not a problem of jurisdiction, but it does send the
case home to the state court. It does relevel virtue on a comparative
basis between the state and federal court to apply law and achieve
justice.
J.
These materials invite attention to the civil rights acts. In them,
the congress exercised its special power of enforcement.' 72 The
168. Cf., Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
169. Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire 'Insurance Association, 296 U.S. 64 (1935).
170. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
171. 341 U.S. 341 (1951). Prentis was decided shortly after Ex parte Young. It
develops and applies the fundamental rule of first exhausting the administrative remedy
before judicial review is sought. This is sometimes referred to weakly as the postpone-
ment of jurisdiction. It is nothing more than the universal final order rule relating the
responsibility of decision or exercising primary jurisdiction into the corrective appellate
process and preserving departmentalization.
172. "The Congress shall have power to enforce by approprate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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acts ' help to identify the general cause of action, given directly to
the individual and self-executing. The great action exists only against
the state. It does not exist against the official or the agent. What
the agent did might be state action within the primary cause but state
action would not be the officer's responsibility. This much the con-
stitution was written to say for itself. To buttress the general cause
and to establish the pro-union policy built about state discretion, the
congress ran around to the other end and put the hood over the person
of the official. It created two statutory causes of action against him,
one penal and one civil. The state official is the victim of both. 174
The government can act only through the agent. If the agent is
paralyzed, the government is impotent. If the agent must go to jail
for doing the government's bidding and then turn over all his property
to the person injured by way of insuring to the individual the virtue
of the state, the individual has both a hammer-lock and a toe-hold
on deprivation. If the conduct of the state was actionable under the
fourteenth amendment, the individual had causes against both the
state and its agent. As the action against the official is broader, the
injured individual may have an action against the official when no
action lies against the state. The official must be an agent when the
state is liable to account to the individual. An extracurricular activity
is enough to hold him liable under the civil rights acts.
K.
Three cases 175 commonly are cited as ,throwing the key block on
action against the state on the ground that if the deprivation of property
is without state authorization there is no constitutional basis for the
cause.'16  The congress gave both a special cause of action against
the official and a special passport to court."' The official must act
under color of state authority in doing an act which would be actionable
against the state if he were executing its mandate. Thus- he can be
liable even though he acted in violation of the state's mandate.' 8  The
173. See not 105 supra.
174. The federal official may not have been given as much opportunity to destroy
himself by doing his duty as the state official.
175. Huntington v. New York, 193 U.S. 441 (1904) ; Barney v. New York, 193
U.S. 430 (1904) ; St. Joseph & G.I.R.R. v. Steele, 167 U.S. 659 (1897).
176. The statement of the Constitution cannot be strengthened by citation of
"authorities."
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1952).
178. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Chief Judge Gourley of the
Pennsylvania District Court (Western District) cannot swallow this idea judicially.
Ginsburg v. Stern, 125 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1954). See the same case, 225 F.2d 245
(3rd Cir. 1955).
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difference between these two positions and the distinction from the
abstention problem of Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern
Ry. Co."7 9 is etched by Chief Judge Denman in Romero v. Weakley.' s'
The friction between this special, statutory, civil right acts cause of
action with the customary has caused a retrenchment by interpretation
in recent cases.1
8
'
X.
A.
Terry v. Adams 182 stems from the fifteenth amendment's assur-
ance that the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged, by a state on account of racial characteristics.
There is some difference from the fourteenth as the fifteenth pushes
the specific union-derived right through state road blocks to the ballot
box. However, the answer depends upon identification of the state;
and, inevitably, by osmosis if nothing more, the special draws from
the general. More often, the state conduct captured by the fourteenth
amendment will be affirmative and prohibitive rather than negative.
Both amendments have a disengaging permissive area where distinction
between contusion and pigmentation is difficult. Both have the task
of finding action by government; and the great travail of the political
right from the private, social fraternity's black-ball to government
abridgment invites comparison of our issue with the prognosis of the
fifteenth amendment and makes Terry v. Adams significant.
When its officials conduct its business as directed, the government
is acting. As original rights are involved, per se, allegation that the
government of the state is engaged in their deprivation raises a
justiciable issue."s  The translation of our cause always will be under
the court's supervision, thus dispelling alarm, for even the King's writ
was prevented from becoming a tyrant's weapon largely by reason of
the fact that it was issued under judicial control. Officials owe their
duty to act immediately to the government, and that duty is to execute
the will of the principal. As we come up to this through the Brimson
case, it is clear that the general right of action under the fourteenth
amendment depends upon the official acting within his jurisdiction
179. See note 171 supra.
180. 226 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1955).
181. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S.
70 (1951) ; William v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) ; Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951). See also Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
182. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
183. See discussion by Chief Judge L. Hand in East Coast Lumber Terminal v.
Babylon, 174 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1949).
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and within the mandate of the government. The public interest and
the official action precept eliminate dependency upon the vicarious
liability projection of private law. Colpoys v. Gates .84 holds Cooper
v. O'Connor 1'8 in check. The official must act within the jurisdiction
given him by his government; but the determination of that jurisdiction,
like the exercise of his discretion, is part of his duty. It includes the
authority to decide wrongly as well as to make correct decisions.' 86
B.
The eleventh amendment also required the identification of state
government. When it first came up for consideration, it was said that
the amendment applies only to suits "in which a state is a party on the
record." 18T A long list of cases establish the course of decision "as
to what is to be deemed a suit against a state . . . it is now well
established that the question is to be determined, not by the mere
names of the titular parties, but by the nature and effect of the proceed-
ing, as it appears from the entire record." "88 The ferreting out of
the party in interest works from the plaintiff's end too, as appears
in the use of the device of assignment for collection in order to escape
the eleventh amendment's individual plaintiff." 9 The contemporary
device to escape the eleventh's state was to sue the official.
"That a State cannot be sued by a citizen of another State
• . . on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, is clearly established
by the decision of this court in several recent cases. (Citing
cases) . . . Relief was sought against state officers who pro-
fessed to act in obedience to those (state) laws. This court
held that the suits were virtually against the States themselves
and were consequently violative of the Eleventh Amendment of
the Constitution, and could not be maintained." "9
The court turns the page to continue in North Carolina v. Temple: '9'
"We think it perfectly clear that the suit against the auditor in this
case was virtually a suit against the State of North Carolina. In this
184. 118 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
185. Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643
(1938). Cf., Gibson v. Reynolds, 172 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1949).
186. There is a complete exposition of this function in West Coast Exploration Co.
v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
187. Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
188. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921).
189. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883). See opposite result under
a true transfer of interest to the plaintiff state. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192
U.S. 286 (1904).
190. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
191. 134 U.S. 22, 30 (1890).
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regard it comes within the principle of the cases . . . " which held 192
that suits against officers who professed to act in obedience to the
mandate of their government were suits against the state. 93
C.
The eleventh amendment dealt with state government. When the
official acted as directed, he was the state. Hans and Temple are the
leading authorities for this meaning. This was the scope of "state"
which took its government out of the federal courts. When the purpose
was to restore that jurisdiction the same term was used. The "state"
taken out by the eleventh was the "state" brought back by the fourteenth.
This is what makes Ex parte Young 194 the monstrosity of the age.
19 5
The federal trial court had issued a preliminary injunction, upon the
suit of railroad stockholders, restraining the railroads from complying
with a state statute which reduced their rates allegedly in violation
of the federal constitution; and also enjoining Young, the state attorney
general, from instituting any proceeding to enforce the penalties and
remedies provided by the statute or to compel obedience to it. The
day after the injunction was granted, Young filed a petition for
mandamus in the state court to direct the railroads to file rates con-
forming to the statute and the court issued the writ. The federal
court then adjudged Young in contempt, and he made an original
application to the Supreme Court for leave to file a petition for habeas
corpus and certiorari. The Supreme Court assumed that leave should
be granted, and the writs issued, if the federal court was without
jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction. The opinion de-
scribed as "the most material and important objection made to the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court" the claim that "the suit is, in effect,
one against the State of Minnesota, and that the injunction issued
against the Attorney General illegally prohibits state action, either
civil or criminal, to enforce obedience to the statutes of the State." 1'
In rejecting the claim, the opinion reviews eleventh amendment cases.
It recognizes that the rule that the amendment applied only to those
192. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
193. In Hans, the case was brought on the contract clause. Despite all the additive,
Mr. Justice Bradley does recognize that there is actionable fault by the state-but the
state cannot be sued there. Id. at 20.
194. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
195. It represents legalism in the extreme. It is the artful beauty and the sophistry
of "law." It has the spirit of excelsior and the method of a Sunday driver going back-
wards down the hill. It does some good by way of a flying trapeze, but there is nothing
but levitation to sustain the swing. It gives a kind of dark light in levoratation.
196. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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"suits in which the State was a party of record" had been abandoned.
The upshot is that suits against state officers to enjoin the enforcement
of state statutes contravening the fourteenth amendment are treated
as suits against the officers, not against the state, so they do not come
within the eleventh amendment. The basis is stated:
"The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and
if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an uncon-
stitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without
the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its
sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act
on the part of a state official in attempting by the use of the name
of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void
because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution,
the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict
with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that
case stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any im-
munity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United
States." 197
Mr. Justice Harlan replied in dissent:
"The suit . . . was, as to the defendant Young, one
against him as, and only because he was, Attorney General of
Minnesota. No relief was sought against him individually but
only in his capacity as Attorney General. And the manifest-
indeed, the avowed and admitted, object of seeking such relief
was to tie the hands of the state, so that it could not in any manner
or by any mode of proceeding, in its own courts, test the validity
of the statutes and order in question. It would therefore seem
clear that within the true meaning of the Eleventh Amendment
the suit brought in the federal court was one, in legal effect,
against the state ... ,, 198
D.
The universal rule '" recognizes, as it must, that a public officer
ordinarily cannot be sued when the state is the real party in interest
or an. indispensable party to enable the court to grant the relief sought,
because that would constitute a suit against the state. It is nice to call
Ex parte Young an exception to this doctrine for an officer who acts
under a statute said to violate the fourteenth amendment. The injunc-
197. Id. at 159, 160.
198. Id. at 173, 174.
199. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
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tion issues because the action is not considered to be a suit against the
state government.2' The first difficulty with this is that the fourteenth
amendment did not cover relations between individuals." ° - The
second is that there is no state sovereign to be immune from fourteenth
amendment actions."' Two things add to explode the Young satellite.
In the first place there just is no fourteenth amendment cause of action
unless there is state government action. The second is that where
there is a fourteenth amendment cause there is no eleventh amendment
to interfere, because that barrier was pulled back enough to let the
fourteenth's individual suit go through to the state. The good, if
the word is not too kind, of Ex parte Young is that no one could fail
to recognize that relief, somehow, must be allowed. We need no
fiction, "here lies the road to Rome"-a strong, straight bridge to
the State shore. In Ex parte Young, the action was against the state
government. It was not within the eleventh amendment.
XI.
A.
The key to the whole difficulty may lie in another fixation. After
a court has concluded adjudication and issued its declaration of the
obligatory legal relations disclosed on the record, it might be functus
officio. For various and good reasons, the power of execution on
judgment became appendant." 5  The problems arising on the funda-
mental issue of judicial review,20 4 namely, whether the federal judicial
power has corrective supervision over a state government, which is
not co-ordinate but subordinate in the federal system, and whether
the subordinate can pass upon the validity of acts of the co-ordinate
department, 2 5 also arise in regard to execution on judgment. There
is a very great difference between a declaration of right-duty and the
200. The civil rights acts would pick him up here, agent or no agent.
201. "Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
Amendment . . . until some State law has been passed, or some State action through
its officers or agents has been taken, no legislation of the United States . . . can be
called into activity." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883); Slaughter House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
202. "The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States
and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is
empowered to enforce against State action, however put forth, whether that action be
executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty.
No law can be which the people of the states have by the Constitution of the United
States, empowered Congress to enact." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
The adoption of the constitution waived sovereign immunity from suit. See Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
203. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
204. Cf., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
205. The latter also is a problem within a state government.
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placing of it in the hands of an executioner.2" The position of Mr.
Justice Gray, perhaps, best explains that of Mr. Justice Iredell in
Chisholm and Mr. Justice Bradley in Hans when he discusses non-
suability of the state in his dissent in Lee.1° 7  What alarms him is not
that there be a declaration of right, but he cannot conceive of execution.
His court, he felt, simply had no power to issue an execution in such
a case. Then, since there could not be judgment without execution
on judgment, there could be no judgment. This is derived from
confusion of departmentalization with judicial review of the action
of a constituent of the federation. Departmentalization is thought to
be involved because execution would cause the executive and legislative
departments to be absorbed by or at least subordinated to the judicial
power." 8 It looked as if the court found that a judgment without
execution would be a legal solecism when it considered Liberty Ware-
house Co. v. Grannis."' When it was faced. with the proposition
that the federal system would split up through finality of constitutional
questions in state declaratory judgment actions, the court confirmed
judgment on a case sans execution in Aetna Life Insurance Company
v. Haworth.21  In Petition of Kariher,2 ' the court recites many
examples of common law actions in which the highest judicial tradition
renders judgment without concern that it will not be followed by
execution. Following Virginia v. West Virginia,212 West Virginia
enacted legislation for the payment of its obligation."' 3
B.
"Upon the whole, I am of the opinion that the Constitution war-
rants a suit against a state, by an individual citizen of another state." 214
206. See note 83 supra. While recognizing that the eleventh amendment ends the
federal jurisdiction of the suit, Hollingsworth confirms the underlying principle of the
cause of action against the state. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378
(1798).
207. See notes 122, 128, 129, 130 supra.
208. Cf., ". . . the inability to enforce the claim against the vessel is not incon-
sistent with its existence." The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868).
209. 273 U.S. 70, 73; (1927). ". . . the judicial power . . . of the United States
• . . does not extend to the determination of abstract questions or issues framed for
the purpose of invoking the advice of the court without real parties or a real case."
This was so because no case was so presented "that the judicial power is capable of
acting upon [it], and pronouncing and carrying into effect a judgment between the
parties. . ....
210. 300 U.S. 227 (1933). Cf., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Enforce-
ment has been considered. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940) ; Virginia
v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918). Cf., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 313 U.S. 547 (1941).
211. 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
212. 246 U.S. 565 (1918).
213. W. VA. Acts ch. 10 (Ex Sess. 1919). Judgments of the Court of Claims lack
execution, and are not destroyed by an absence of present appropriation. Surely, the
Congress will not be made to appropriate satisfaction.
214. Mr. Justice Cushing in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) 419, 469 (1793).
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It is not dispute of this suability as a general right of action that has
caused the repression. Even Mr. Justice Bradley says in Hans that
it exists for "undoubtedly a state may be sued by its own consent." 215
Likewise, when the United States government appears, "it waives its
exemption and submits to the application of the same principles by
which justice is administered between private suitors." 210 Cross
claims always have been allowed. These receive recent confirmation
and expansion in National City Bank v. Republic of China,2" with
a significant inroad into the immunity terminology. It is not the
suability that has been denied. Horror, needlessly, has been held of
that bob-tailed judgment adumbrated by a confused departmentalism."'
C.
The purpose here is not join the ululation of the multitudes at
the misconceived doctrine of immunity. Moribund, it may rust away
or the legislatures may move in common decency.219 The purpose
here is to demonstrate the positive function and the repealing operation
of the fourteenth amendment, and that Ex parte Young and its
numerous progeny must be set aside as falsely conceived and erroneously
decided. The mangled individual has a direct cause of action for the
causal fault of the state government for which it must account. This
is a fundamental right participle to our ordered liberty under law.
215. 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890). See also note 193 supra. "Although a state may not be
sued without its consent, such immunity is a privilege which may be waived, and hence,
where a state voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial
determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of its voluntary
act by involving the Eleventh Amendment." Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.Co., 200
U.S. 273, 284 (1906).
216. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 159 (1868).
217. 348 U.S. 356 (1955). The advance made in West Coast Exploration Co. v.
McKay, 213 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954), should be
considered against Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation, 337 U.S. 682
(1949), on the general right under national law. Even in the cases under the civil
rights acts, relief is disclosed by gauging state action. See cases cited note 181, supra.
218. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931), held that
systematic discrimination against petitioners by state officials charged with the assess-
ment of taxes was "state action", although the state court already had considered the
question and held that the acts were unauthorized and were not "state action." "When
a state official, acting under color of state authority, invades, in the course of his duties,
a private right secured by the federal Constitution, that right is violated, even if the
state officer not only exceeded his authority, but disregarded special commands of the
state law." Id. at 246.
"Cases discussing the question of what constitutes a suit against the State within
the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment . . . have no bearing upon the power of this
court to protect rights secured by the federal Constitution." Id. at 246, n...
"The prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is true, has reference exclusively
to action by the State, as distinguished from action by private individuals." Id. at 245.
219. See Campbell v. State, 186 Misc. 586, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 638 (Ct. CL. 1946). I
hope to help in that persuasion but there is no purpose here to join the multitude at the
wailing wall. 43 STA't. 1112, 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1952) discloses the advance in federal
legislation.
[VOL. 2: p. 16
49
Smith: Government Accountability
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1956
